Can Ukraine count on the support of the United States to achieve a just peace?

By Volodymyr Dubovyk, Visiting Scholar at the Fletcher Russia and Eurasia Program

While Russia’s large-scale war against Ukraine has been going on for well over two years and there is no end in sight, there is also talk of peace. Is peace possible? What kind of peace could this be? On what terms? What would be the role of the United States, the supposed heavyweight as a military superpower in this process?

First and foremost, the fastest way to peace would be if Russia ended its war of aggression. However, there are no signs of this at all. On the contrary, Russia seems to want to reap the fruits of the current war of attrition. In such a war, by definition, the one who has the greater human, natural and financial resources has the advantage. Russia has adapted to the sanctions, is able to produce more weapons, and receives supplies from allies such as Iran or North Korea.

It is important for Ukraine not only that Russia stops its war of aggression, but also that it withdraws its troops from all occupied Ukrainian territories. The position of Ukraine has always been that the territorial integrity of the country must be fully restored. This is reflected in Zelensky’s “Formula for Peace”[1] as well as in his “ten-point plan”[2]. Territorial integrity was and is formally the central and indispensable part of the Ukrainian position. While it was possible to liberate some occupied territories of Ukraine in 2022 and there were great expectations for a large-scale counteroffensive in 2023, it is obvious in the fall of 2024 that it will hardly be possible to liberate the occupied territories in the near future.

No one wants peace more than the Ukrainians. The country has already been a target of the Russian invasion army for quite some time. It has also become clear what price Ukraine has to pay for its defense. This is also reflected in opinion polls, where there is a slow but steady increase in the share of those who support possible negotiations with Russia.[3] However, this does not mean that the people of Ukraine would be in any way ready to accept a Russian ultimatum to surrender or territorial concessions to the enemy. Since Russia does not pause and shows no signs of willingness to compromise, the positions of the two sides are far apart.

Nevertheless, peace is on everyone’s lips. Unfortunately, some people have formulated ideas about a “peace” that comes at the expense of Ukraine and is intended to appease Russia. The spirit of the Munich Agreement of 1938 is in the air. The much-touted Sino-Brazilian “Peace Plan”[4] should be considered from this point of view. The proposal of an unconditional ceasefire implies the freezing of the conflict (for an indefinite period) along the current front line. This would basically confirm the Russian land robbery. These proposals are coupled with the demand to lift the existing sanctions, which would mean abandoning one of the central instruments with which Russia can be held accountable for its war of aggression and influence its actions. It is little wonder that Ukrainians would not consider this as the just peace that they deserve, and which would be in accordance with the norms of international law and the international order. In reality, this would by no means be a peace, but would encourage Russia to continue with its aggression and continue its project of undermining the sovereignty of Ukraine. To the point of destroying all Ukrainian statehood.

Outside of Ukraine, there is an increasing perception that the country is doomed and Russia will prevail. However, such a failure of Ukraine is not set in stone. In reality, there is a real chance for Ukraine to at least – and this is extremely important – achieve considerable tactical successes and further complicate the Russian war effort. However, turning the entire course of the war completely remains a more unlikely scenario. Nevertheless, such tactical successes have been considered with good reason as something that would improve Ukraine’s negotiating position if some kind of peace talks were to take place one day. In order to achieve this, Ukraine would have to receive assistance from its international partners at least to the considerable extent that has been the case so far. In reality, Ukraine needs even more than the previous support. The pro-Ukrainian coalition would have to double both arms supplies and humanitarian aid. So far, it seems that these aids are shrinking. And this is at a time when Russia continues to receive weapons from North Korea and Iran, and considerable support from the People’s Republic of China. There is a lack of faith in the ultimate success of Ukraine, as well as the ability to quickly acquire weapons. And in the end, the necessary political will is often lacking.

The current situation has led the Ukrainian leadership to demand an extension of assistance instead of a slowdown, and with a certain urgency. The role of the United States in what follows next in this war is of very great importance. This is rightly seen by Ukraine as well. The recent visit of President Zelensky to the USA has made this even clearer. Zelensky had his “victory plan” in his luggage. As far as the content of this plan is known,[5] it is about a call for an intensification of aid, in particular the supply of weapons. According to the Ukrainian assessment, this is necessary in order to possibly regain the initiative in this war. The demand for permission to attack military targets in Russia with long-range weapons of Western production far beyond the border is an important part of the plan.

Kyiv is neutral in the US presidential election campaign. Ukraine has traditionally benefited from bipartisan support, especially as far as the Congress is concerned. To upset this delicate balance is the last thing that Kyiv can want right now. There is an increasing dissatisfaction with the Biden administration, and this is because one perceives a timidity, even fear of a possible escalation by Russia and delays in arms deliveries. This may have led Kyiv to the conclusion that changing the guard from the Democrats to the Republicans would not be so bad at all. However, there is also no conviction in Kyiv that another Trump term would be better for Ukraine.

The Biden administration is adamant about the Ukrainian demand to allow attacks deep into Russian territory. With all the “red lines” that have been crossed since February 2022, this now seems to be inviolable for the White House, because they are afraid of being drawn into the war; the considerations are still dominated by a possible escalation by Russia. Of course, all this is happening in the context of the upcoming presidential election. Republicans are divided on support for Ukraine. Some of the advocates of national security, hawks of the old school, are in favor of a continuation of assistance. Others, on the other hand, a very active wing in the party, are against it. The leader of this wing is presidential candidate Donald Trump. The latter is ambiguous about his will for Ukraine to win, as well as about the fundamental question of whether supporting Ukraine serves the interests of the United States.

And what about peace? Trump has said that he will quickly ensure peace when he becomes president. He really seems to be in the belief that he can achieve peace immediately. However, the contours of a possible Trumpian peace plan are not entirely clear. Trump’s candidate for vice president, J.D. Vance, is venturing forward with a broad-based vision that is basically similar to the Sino-Brazilian plan. This vision coincides with the prevailing views in Trump’s closest environment. There are no signs that Trump has thought through this plan in detail. Of course, Ukraine would not welcome such a strategy. So there might be hope that this approach will change over the course of a possible Trump term. However, there are no reliable reasons for such a hope.

The Biden administration has apparently struggled quite a lot throughout the war, coming up with a strategic vision of what an optimal outcome of the war could look like and how peace could be achieved. At the moment, there is no evidence that President Biden will promote Ukraine aid with a strong initiative in his remaining term of office, be it before the elections or in the period after. Biden seems satisfied with the current level of support. He believes that the US has done more than enough to support Ukraine. And he does not worry about his “legacy” on this issue.

With Kamala Harris, no independent Ukraine strategy can be identified that would differ from that of the incumbent president. Moreover, if she were to signal something like this, it would be a significant violation of etiquette, since Biden is still commander-in-chief and responsible for shaping policy. If there were to be differences, they would most likely consist in some tactical nuances, and not in the essence of politics. This could perhaps concern the type of weapons delivered, but nothing essential. There will probably be a continuity in the Ukraine policy, in which Harris will neither reduce nor increase Ukraine assistance. Much, of course, will depend on the Congress and its composition after the elections.

It remains to be noted that the Biden administration supported Ukraine in a very significant way. But she failed to formulate a strategic vision of what should come next, and what would best serve the interests of the United States. This can be partly explained by the dynamic nature of the war. And by assuming – which is basically justified – that Ukraine should decide its own fate, including how it should fight, and whether it should strive for peace, and when. The statements in support of an eventual victory of Ukraine and that a victory of Russia must be prevented are important, but not sufficient as such. There should be a series of steps reflecting the urgency of the situation and based on the conviction that Russia’s victory in the war must be prevented; to do this, it would be necessary to increase the volume of weapons supplied. It is of the utmost importance to ensure that the war is not lost. And that the peace will not be lost afterwards either. Only then can Ukraine possibly steer towards a just and meaningful peace.

The contours of such a peace are still not defined. They, of course, will depend on the situation at the front. If this can be stabilized and the Russian advances can be stopped – and here the US arms supplies remain crucial – a better negotiating position could result for Ukraine. It seems that, on the whole, Washington has understood that the realistic goal is precisely to secure a reasonable negotiating position for Ukraine so that Russia is not put in a position to simply roll over everything with its ultimatums and repeated demands for surrender.

Much will depend on what long-term security format will turn out for Ukraine. The discussion on NATO membership will continue, as it best serves the country’s security interests. That would be better than leaving Ukraine in the dark. However, it seems that there will be no early progress on this issue. It is also unlikely that Ukraine will receive binding and substantial security guarantees from other countries in the event of non-attainable NATO membership. Meanwhile, what remains is to make the most of the existing security packages that the US and other members of the pro-Ukrainian coalition are providing to Ukraine. The most important goal is to provide Ukraine with the appropriate resources and to further reduce the asymmetry in this conflict, both in the short and long term. This would make the Kremlin’s goal of undermining Ukraine’s sovereignty and security an increasingly difficult challenge for the latter.

This post has been translated from German.

(This post is republished from Country Analyses.)