Europe 2029: Eight Policy Priorities for the New European Commission

By Marija Golubeva, Volodymyr Dubovyk, Jessica Berlin, and Sam Greene (Dubovyk is a Visiting Scholar at the Fletcher Russia and Eurasia Program)

Executive Summary 

• Task One for the new European Commission must be winning the fiscal war with Russia by overcoming political barriers to consistent financial aid to Ukraine and tightening the screws on Russia’s hydrocarbon revenues. 
• Because reconstruction must begin long before the war ends if it is to be effective, Task Two is to maintain the pace of humanitarian aid and commit to breaking the back of Ukraine’s accession negotiations by 2029. 
• If Europe is to carry its strategic weight, Task Three must be to begin making good on its arms production promises and deliver stepwise surges in European Union (EU), member-state, and private-sector investment. 
• Longer-term stability and prosperity on the continent will hinge on the ability of the new Commission to maintain the pace of Ukraine’s European integration and reinvigorate the EU enlargement process as a whole, comprising Task Four. 
• As Moscow increasingly pursues gray-zone aggression within Europe itself, Task Five is to build the capacity for rapid identification of hybrid threats and retaliation sufficient to impose deterrence. 
• Task Six must be to develop and implement a medium-to-long-term policy of containment for Russia. 
• Considering growing strategic tensions, Task Seven is to begin a concerted process of reviewing and recalibrating the EU’s economic and strategic relationship with China. 
• Finally, Task Eight is to reestablish trust and partnership between Europe and the “global middle ground” to present a more united front against Russia now, and potentially against China in the future. 

Introduction: Seeking Constancy in Shifting Sands 

Ursula von der Leyen’s first European Commission — inaugurated in 2019 — inherited a smoldering conflict in Ukraine and emergent trade wars with both China and the United States. Pivoting to what she called a “geopolitical Commission,” using a term once anathema in the European Union bureaucracy, von der Leyen, together with High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Josep Borrell, stabilized relations with both Washington and Beijing, only to find themselves staring down a hot war with Russia. 

It is, in many ways, the response to that war that has brought von der Leyen to a second term running Europe. The challenges she and her new Commission will face, however, are deeper than ever. A protracted war is sapping Brussels’ fiscal and political reserves precisely at the time when visionary thinking — and visionary spending — is most in demand. Set to be joined by former Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas as high representative and former Lithuanian Prime Minister Andrius Kubilius as the EU’s inaugural defense commissioner, von der Leyen will need to move rapidly along multiple fronts if her second Commission is to make good on the promise of her first. 

Consistency, meanwhile, will be no less important than speed. Winning the war in Ukraine, deterring further Russian aggression, and restoring peace and stability across Europe will require constant attention and durable commitments — all the more so because such constancy and durability may not be forthcoming from Washington. The challenge for Brussels is thus multiplied: European leadership is simultaneously more important and more difficult than ever. 

Task 1: Win the Fiscal War 

In the first 28 months of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the European Commission allocated $42.4 billion in direct aid to Kyiv¹ and helped marshal a further $58.6 billion in aid from EU member states. On that measure alone, von der Leyen settled the question of whether the “geopolitical Commission”² she proclaimed in 2019 would have the fiscal courage of its rhetorical convictions in the face of Moscow’s aggression. Clearly, it did. The question for von der Leyen’s second Commission — slated to be even more hawkish than the first — is not simply whether she can build on that success. It is whether the Commission can muster enough European leadership to turn the tide in an increasingly stalemated war. 

Vladimir Putin faces no political constraints on his ability to spend on his war effort. If he is to be convinced that no victory is available, he must see similar constancy from Europe. First and foremost, this means that the new Commission must overcome the financial constraints that have, in recent months, led to more than a bit of “creative accounting,”³ as well as the political constraints⁴ imposed by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico, who are becoming increasingly obstreperous. Moves toward redirecting the proceeds⁵ of seized Russian sovereign assets are welcome but are not a substitute for budgetary allocations. The creation of a new defense commissioner is also welcome, but it is critical that any potential competition over control and resources between Kubilius and Kallas does not get in the way of allocating and spending new money. 

As important as spending on the war is, the Commission must also ramp up its attention to the other side of the fiscal coin. While sanctions have not prevented Moscow from continuing its war, they have nevertheless been impactful⁶ — and could be made considerably more impactful by sharpening the focus on Russia’s core revenue streams. Out-of-the-box thinking, ideally in tandem with Washington and London, will be needed to take the wind out of the sails of the shadow tanker fleet⁷ currently allowing Russia to evade the Group of Seven price cap on oil. At the same time, the new Commission should encourage member states to prioritize further an irreversible decoupling from Russian hydrocarbons, sapping Gazprom’s already troubled finances⁸ and allowing Ukraine to sever its gas transit dependency⁹ once and for all. 

Task 2: Prepare for Peace 

Even as the Commission seeks to find the money to win the war, it must begin planning for what comes next. Best estimates put the cost for Ukrainian recovery and reconstruction¹⁰ at $1 trillion. But while that price tag is well in excess of anything that the European Union can afford on its own, marshaling resources from member states, the United States, and elsewhere will require strategic leadership from Brussels. This is in large measure because the future of Ukraine as a viable economy depends so heavily on European integration. If Europe cannot maintain Ukraine’s progress on that front, governments and corporations will balk at making major investments. 

While the previous Commission offered Ukraine candidate status and opened accession negotiations, it must be the task of the new Commission to get Ukraine right up to — or perhaps even over — the line. Ongoing Russian aggression will complicate further progress, but this work is doable. If anything, Ukraine has proved that it can do much to meet the criteria, even while under assault. Indeed, progress toward meeting membership criteria helps bolster Ukraine’s resilience against Russian aggression by increasing public sector efficacy and reducing corruption.  

Reconstruction and recovery, meanwhile, will be unattainable if the work starts only after the fighting stops. Recognizing that, channeling money for humanitarian purposes has been a bedrock of the Commission’s approach from day one. This aid has helped the Ukrainian government keep critical services and the economy afloat. With Russia’s incessant assaults against Ukraine’s infrastructure set to increase, the Commission must devise more ways to deliver more aid and to deliver it more efficiently. Further, it should not relax its assistance to Ukrainian refugees in EU member states or to the millions of Ukrainians who have become internally displaced persons. Brussels must understand that these tasks require a sustained effort, and it should continue to coordinate the European response to this massive challenge.  

Task 3: Surge Defense-Industrial Production 

For all of the last Commission’s evident successes in supporting Ukraine, Borrell’s promise to deliver a million artillery shells has been a spectacular failure, the lessons of which must urgently be heeded. The creation of the European Defence Fund,¹¹ tasked with laying the foundation for a revitalized European defense industry, is a timid step in the right direction. If the fund is to be effective, the next Commission must invest orders of magnitude more than the initial €8 billion ($8.73 billion) assignation. No amount of money will make a difference, however, if the future of European defense production gets bogged down in territorial squabbles among Kallas as High Representative, Kubilius as Commissioner for Defense, and Stéphane Séjourné as Vice President for Prosperity and Industrial Strategy. 

Recent developments underscore the urgency of this issue. A Czech-led artillery initiative contracted¹² the first 180,000 ammunition rounds for Ukraine in April, but this is well short of the 800,000 rounds that had been identified as the target in February. There are also hesitations in providing certain advanced weapons systems. For instance, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz continues¹³ to block the transfer of Taurus cruise missiles to Kyiv despite calls from coalition partners and a majority in the Bundestag to provide this advanced missile system. These shortfalls highlight the ongoing challenges in meeting Ukraine’s critical ammunition needs and the importance of ramping up production capabilities. 

There are, however, strong foundations on which the Commission can build. European capitals have increased defense spending by 16% in 2023, and through two landmark bills, the European Union has allocated over €800 million ($873 million) for common procurement risk mitigation and ammunition production. These laws further include a series of incentives for joint domestic procurement. Given the state of the European defense industries, however, making rapid progress will require the Commission to look beyond the borders of the common market, in particular to the United Kingdom¹⁴ and the United States, for meaningful defense-industrial cooperation. 

Task 4: Prioritize Enlargement 

As the EU begins accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova, the new Commission must avoid the pitfalls of the Western Balkans process, which has cast doubt on Europe’s seriousness about expansion. Failure to present clear commitments and allow national interests to dominate could push these nations toward authoritarian alternatives, exemplified by Serbia’s and Georgia’s increasing ties with China. The EU must prioritize supporting Ukraine’s reformers and civil society, and bolster Moldova’s capacity to withstand hybrid attacks from Russia, particularly in the run-up to its elections.

Georgia’s pivot toward authoritarianism, marked by repressive laws against civil society and free media, mirroring earlier backsliding in Serbia and elsewhere, underscores the EU’s failure to curb such trends among aspiring members. The new Commission should support democratic forces within Georgia, which remain committed to EU integration, and counter Russian influence in the region. Similarly, Bosnia and the Western Balkans require continued support to combat corruption and restore trust in the European project, lest the region fall further prey to malign actors and sour EU publics on enlargement as such. 

The truly hard work on enlargement, however, is within Europe itself.¹⁵ Accommodating new members — particularly Ukraine — will be impossible without significant reform of the EU’s Structural and Cohesion Funds and the Common Agricultural Policy, as well as the procedures for electing the European Parliament, composing the European Commission, and decision-making, particularly on foreign policy. The good news is that a similar scale of reform has been necessary to absorb each previous major wave of new members, so none of this is inherently impossible. Ultimately, however, procrastination is the enemy of both progress and stability. The new Commission must not leave these tasks to whoever succeeds them in 2029: if European reform is not tackled now, the challenges will only multiply. 

Task 5: Address Shadow Warfare 

Even as Europe seeks victory in Ukraine, it is facing a Russian shadow war at home. An escalating tide¹⁶ of sub-war but nonetheless deadly aggression¹⁷ — including tactics ranging from inciting conflict through disinformation to assassinations, arson, sabotage, and bombings — shows no signs of abating and is evidently a core element of the Kremlin’s strategy to wear down Western resolve. Elsewhere, Moscow is seeking to support authoritarian populist governments trying to consolidate their grip on power, including through the promulgation of so-called foreign agent laws¹⁸ and other pages from the Kremlin playbook. 

Thus far, the European Commission’s response to such gray-zone threats is embryonic at best. The new Commission needs as a matter of urgency to modernize and strengthen its approach to hybrid threats by building institutions with a high capacity to detect, understand, and counter shadow aggression in the EU and its neighborhood. This will require greater coordination and intelligence sharing among member states and between the EU and NATO. Critical to this effort — and an opportunity for the new Commission to take the lead — is the need to develop a new doctrine of gray-zone deterrence capable of altering calculations in Moscow or any other capital that would pursue disruption. 

Task 6: Contain Russia 

The outgoing European Commission’s response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine — unlike previous Commissions’ responses to the invasion of Georgia in 2008 or annexation of Crimea in 2014 — created a startling, if belated, volte-face in Europe’s relations with Russia. The task of the incoming Commission is to cement that transformation. Recognizing that Russia is likely to remain a threat to European peace, stability, and prosperity for years if not decades to come requires a pivot to containment,¹⁹ designed not to deepen conflict with Russia, but to ensure that the inexorable conflict that does exist cannot escalate into a more catastrophic war. 

In practice, this means guarding against knee-jerk attempts to roll back sanctions before lasting change in foundations of the relationship — including the restoration of Ukrainian territorial integrity, and the democratization of Russia’s internal politics — have taken hold. Snapping back to the pre-war status quo ante will ensure more conflict with Russia, not less. At the same time, Europe should support the remaining islands of civil society, including those in exile, and discretely keep a lifeline for the few groups and individuals bravely practicing civil disobedience inside Russia. And it should mobilize European soft power to create alternatives for citizens of the region’s remaining autocracies — particularly Belarus, and in the South Caucasus and Central Asia — seeking a better future. 

Accomplishing this will require the Commission to develop — together with member states — a clearer view of Europe’s own interests vis-à-vis Russia and the countries located between the EU and Russia, and to transform those interests into a long-term strategy for Russia that accepts the reality of conflict now but aspires to something better in the future. Maintaining this focus, even as Washington is likely to pivot its attention to Beijing, will be critical to the future of European security. 

Task 7: De-risk the EU-Sino Relationship 

Despite Ursula von der Leyen’s famous formula of “de-risking, not de-coupling,” mirroring the approach of US President Joe Biden, Europe continues to find itself in a precarious position. Given the reliance of Europe’s clean energy industry on Chinese rare earths and other raw materials, the growing dispute over electric car imports suggests that China intends to dominate new high-value industrial markets and has no intention of allowing its raw materials to enable the emergence of strong European competitors. 

These intentions, combined with China’s hegemonic ambitions in the Indo-Pacific, its support of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and its disregard for human rights and international law, present a troubling trade partner at best for Europe. Meanwhile, infrastructure projects in Europe have allowed China to gain political influence in the region, driving nations like Georgia, Serbia, and Montenegro away from the West and diminishing prospects of integration. The new Commission must review its China policy and encourage similar reflections among member state governments, making sure to remain firm in its dialogue with Beijing not just on electric vehicles, but also on Chinese infrastructure and influence operations across the continent, and on its continued support for Russian aggression.  

Task 8: Rebuild Trust in the Global Middle Ground 

Europe’s ability to hold the line on Russia has been undermined in part by the inability of Western leaders as a whole to gain the trust and support of governments and societies outside of the transatlantic community. With notable exceptions, such as Japan and Taiwan, “middle ground” states have refused to take sides in efforts to impose costs on Russia for its aggression, choosing instead to maintain flexibility and avoid unnecessary entanglements. Others, notably Iran and North Korea, have thrown their full weight behind Moscow. In the advent of a genuine conflict with Beijing, the balance of global policymaking could shift even more decisively against Europe. 

With new leadership — and a foreign policy team headed by the former victims of Russian imperialism — the new Commission has the opportunity to overcome the mistrust generated by centuries of colonialism and post-colonial exploitation. Rhetoric alone, however, will not suffice. Moscow and Beijing have accrued the support of governments in East Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America not because of ideological affinity or even sympathy for their cause, but because they provide services, ranging from infrastructure development to regime security, that leaders find valuable. While Europe cannot and should not be in the business of propping up autocrats, it can and must do better in helping the global middle ground obtain fairer trading terms with the West and overcome the impacts of war, pandemic, famine, and climate change. 

Conclusions 

Resilience must be the watchword for von der Leyen’s second European Commission: resilience of focus when buffeted from both sides of the Atlantic, resilience of commitment in an uncertain war, and resilience of leadership as difficulties compound. The Commission will need to navigate a complex set of tasks, from financing the war effort and preparing for Ukraine’s reconstruction to defending against Russian hybrid aggression and embedding a strategy to withstand long-term conformation, all while pursuing difficult but necessary internal political and fiscal reforms. 

The Commission’s success will depend on its ability to foster cooperation across portfolios and among member states, among competing defense-industrial sectors, and with important but sometimes unreliable allies, including both the United Kingdom and the US. Achieving these goals will require strategic vision, a clear and unwavering commitment to European interests, and the ability to adapt to an increasingly multipolar world, where Russia remains a persistent threat. The opportunities for progress, however, are there, and if they are seized, the EU will emerge a stronger geopolitical actor than it has ever been. 

(This post is republished from CEPA.)