Fletcher Students Attend Warsaw Security Forum 2025
In September 2025, a group of Fletcher students traveled to Warsaw, Poland to attend the annual security forum. The delegation was led by Arik Burakovsky, Associate Director of the Tufts University Center for Expanding Viewpoints on Higher Education. Members of the Fletcher delegation shared their brief essays inspired by the Forum and impressions with Russia and Eurasia Program.
Linda Bachg, PhD Student, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
Weaponizing Time: Memory, Childhood, and the Politics of Abduction in Ukraine
It’s not every day you see an armored military vehicle parked in front of a conference hotel. Its barrel pointed toward the glass canopy of the porte-cochère, it served as a stark reminder of the war still raging just a few hundred miles to the east. Even before the opening remarks, the gravity of this year’s conference theme — “For our Freedom and Yours” — was clear among those queuing to enter the Warsaw Security Forum.
As a PhD student researching how collective memories are created and shape the emergence of future conflicts, I came to the conference not only interested in the political debates at the Forum but also curious about the atmosphere I would encounter in Poland. On my first day in Warsaw, walking down the recently renamed Avenue of the Victims of Russian Aggression – where the Russian Embassy now stands – gave me an early glimpse of the fervent energy with which Polish panelists, in particular, stood up for Ukrainian freedom and independence.
Having both endured foreign, imperialist domination at the hands of the Soviet Union and faced the threat of erasure of their national identities, the two nations share a profound sense of solidarity. Both fiercely cherish and defend these identities. This is why the issue of Ukrainian children being abducted into Russia, as urgently highlighted by Nobel Peace Prize laureate Oleksandra Matviichuk, represents an act of unimaginable cruelty with genocidal intent.[1] At the Forum, the human rights lawyer did not only underline the severity of the crime of kidnapping more than 20,000 children to then be adopted anonymously into Russian families, without any traceability, or get indoctrinated and militarized in dedicated camps.[2] Matviichuk also stressed the fact that time is rapidly running out for many of these children – the time to spend a childhood in safety and where they belong. Alarmingly, she spoke of a deep fear she harbors: that these Ukrainian children could one day be forced to fight against their own people on Russia’s side if no urgent action is taken to return them.
A 2025 report by Yale’s Humanitarian Research Lab identified at least 130 camps in which Ukrainian children of all genders are subject to indoctrination efforts and receive military training.[3] In 39 of these facilities, children as young as eight are being forced to undergo such programs. These activities are in violation of a variety of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Laws and Conventions, including the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Geneva Conventions. In 2023, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Russian Commissioner for Children’s Rights, Maria Lvova-Belova, and President Putin for the alleged war crime of the unlawful deportation of Ukrainian children.[4] Nevertheless, the number of such camps is only increasing, and only a small fraction of children has been returned to their families.
Cynthia Enloe, a leading feminist theorist, coined the phrase “later is a patriarchal timezone.”[5] Usually, this phrase is used to describe the way in which issues of marginalized groups are being dismissed in favor or more “urgent” priorities like military activities. Those holding power are usually the ones defining those priorities, and for them the time for the later issues may never seem to come.
In the case of abducted children, however, later is not even a possibility, because memory as well as childhood have an expiration date and time itself is a weapon. Every day spent in captivity erases another trace of language, memory, and belonging. Each moment lost deepens the rupture between a child and their homeland, transforming what could be a temporary displacement into a permanent act of cultural erasure. The longer these children remain in exile, the more their sense of self is rewritten by those who claim ownership over their past.
If, as I believe, collective memory shapes the conflicts to come, then silence and inaction today lays the groundwork for tomorrow’s wars. Not only will the abduction of Ukrainian children disrupt Russian-Ukrainian relations long after the war is over – it also sets dangerous precedents for other future conflicts of weaponizing time and memory in the most gruesome way. The international community must therefore recognize that protecting these children is not a peripheral humanitarian task but a central act of preventing future conflict and preserving the integrity of historical truth – for our freedom and theirs.
[1] https://thehill.com/opinion/5262131-return-ukrainian-children/, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/us-house-resolution-russian-abduction-of-ukrainian-children-is-genocide/
[2] https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2025/sep/16/russia-has-network-of-200-camps-for-brainwashing-ukrainian-children-report, https://war-sanctions.gur.gov.ua/en/kidnappers/persons?page=2&per-page=12, https://thehill.com/opinion/5262131-return-ukrainian-children
[3] https://medicine.yale.edu/lab/khoshnood/news-article/ukraines-stolen-children-inside-russias-network-of-re-education-and-militarization/
[4] https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-children-taken-ukraine/32527298.html, https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-ukraine-icc-judges-issue-arrest-warrants-against-vladimir-vladimirovich-putin-and
[5] Enloe C. (2004, 215) Curious Feminist: Searching for Women in a New Age of Empire. Berkeley: University of California Press.ge of Empire. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Klaudia Snacka, MATA ’26
Europe’s Investments in the ‘War of Technology’: Insights from the Black Sea
In 2025, the Black Sea has reemerged not only as a central theatre in the contest over European security and strategic coherence, but as a technological frontier of modern warfare. Far from a peripheral representation of maritime control or territorial defence, the Ukraine-Russia war has posited the Black Sea as a laboratory for automation, drone warfare, and the reconfiguration of power in the twenty-first century. In this landscape, the EU faces another challenge, one of leveraging drone-enabled change in warfare, while avoid sector-specific investment insecurities.
The Black Sea: Testing Ground of Automation
Ukraine’s naval campaign has fundamentally transformed the military balance in the Black Sea. Deprived of a large surface fleet, Ukraine has turned to drones and asymmetrical warfare to counter Russia’s superior firepower. Indeed, through a combination of missile-based and drone operations – an “automated navy” – Kyiv has degraded a considerable part of Russia’s fleet, reducing Moscow’s ability to project maritime power (Kirichenko, 2025, a).
The results have been strategically significant. In September 2025, Ukrainian naval drones struck the Black Sea port of Tuapse, damaging oil export infrastructure and temporarily halting shipments (ibid.). Similar attacks have hit Novorossiysk, the main base of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet (ibid.). Each strike has not only disrupted logistics but also demonstrated the futility of traditional naval deterrence against the “biggest battlefield innovation in a generation” (Hegseth 2024, cited by Hidalgo, 2025). These systems have allowed Ukraine to project power far beyond its conventional means. The Black Sea has thus become the world’s most active experimental field for automated warfare.
The shifting reality of comparatively “cheap drones” destroying “ultra-expensive ships” has altered the “power dynamics and economics of combat” (ibid.). Russia’s model of accepting high losses of both equipment and manpower contrasts with Ukraine’s agile innovation cycles, with Ukrainian defence technologists being forced to design at unprecedented speeds(Kirichenko, 2025, b). However, this accelerated tempo may be beginning to blur the line between battlefield necessity and commercial opportunity.
Behind the Innovation
Across Europe, the boom in drone innovation has spilled into the private sector. Over 230 defence-tech startups have been founded since Russia’s full-scale invasion, with venture capital investments reaching an impressive $1.5 billion (Pfeifer, 2025). Some, however, have warned against this enthusiasm, with the CEO of Rheinmetall, Europe’s largest arms manufacturer, cautioning that “the business of making military drones could be the defence sector’s biggest bubble” (Bryant, 2025; Gallardo, MacDonald, 2025). Indeed, valuations have skyrocketed, often based on prototypes that are not yet combat-ready. With hundreds of start-ups competing for limited defence contracts, the so-called ‘hype cycle’, may already be approaching its peak (Pfeifer, 2025).
In defence, the cost is strategic and the EU finds itself with a dilemma: how to ramp up drone-capability, manage the risks of rapid investment and misallocation, all while ensuring a payoff in both littoral operations and support to Ukraine. When expectations outpace technical maturity or market demand, a “shake-out” follows: weaker firms collapse, investors withdraw (Pfeifer, 2025). While such cycles can ultimately strengthen industries by purging inefficiencies, in the defence sector the fallout is more perilous. A sudden contraction could leave Europe dependent on a handful of suppliers, stall innovation and translate into serious security consequences on the continent.
Such potential consequences for the Black Sea are particularly acute. If a bubble were to burst before Europe’s drone production base becomes sustainable, the EU could face a gap in the technologies now defining the conflict in the region. A downturn in investment would risk freezing this innovation pipeline precisely when the balance of power remains fluid. The irony, then, is that Europe’s rearmament drive could sow the seeds of future vulnerability if it rests on speculative foundations.
Toward a Sustainable Black Sea Strategy
The European Union (EU), has not taken the “war of technology” in the Black Sea for granted (Kirichenko, 2025, a). The European Investment Bank’s (EIB) modification of lending rules to account for “military investments”, hypothetically including drones themselves, marks only an aspect of this strategic shift (Pugent, 2025). Further, the European Defence Fund (EDF) has expanded to include drone technologies, while the Commission is reviewing ideas for drone funding modelled on the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) (Pugent, Cohen, 2025). Most notably perhaps, the EU’s new Strategic Approach to the Black Sea (May 2025) begins to account for central issues pertaining to the region, such as security, connectivity, and resilience. Yet, as several experts have noted, an ‘approach’ without binding commitments risks becoming an empty exercise. While these steps represent a crucial recognition that automation and investment will help shape future deterrence, they also expose Europe to new forms of financial and strategic risk.
Upon this backdrop, the Black Sea represents the confluence of two revolutions: one geopolitical, the other technological. Its waters are not only contested militarily but also economically and digitally, thus making it dependant on factors beyond conventional conflict management but ones of innovation governance. To be clear, it is not about investing less, but about investing smart, strategic and future-conscious. As the Warsaw Security Forum (WSF) (29-30 September 2025) reminded policymakers, winning the war before the war, requires more than deterrence, namely, actionable foresight. Europe must ensure that the next great leap in defence technology strengthens, rather than destabilises, its collective security.
Conclusion
In the Black Sea, the contours of future warfare, European defence strategy and support to Ukraine, converge. Policymakers should view drones not as gadgets but as vectors of systemic change: they challenge legacy platforms, shift naval dynamics, and force thinking about industrial policy and integration. The EU must avoid being late to the frontier. As the EU’s own strategy asserts, a secure, interconnected and prosperous Black Sea region is central to European security.
References
Bryant, C., “Europe’s Drone Investment Hype May Be Unsustainable”. Bloomberg Opinion, 19 September 2025.
European Commission, Joint Communication: EU Strategic Approach to the Black Sea Region. Brussels: European Commission, JOIN(2025)135 final, 28 May 2025.
European Union External Actions Service, EU strategic approach to the Black Sea region. Brussels: EEAS, 2025. Available from: link.
Gallardo, C., MacDonald, A., “Rheinmetall CEO Warns of a Military Drone Bubble”. The Wall Street Journal, 12 September 2025.
Gray, A., Mukherjeem, S., Hunder, M., “EU scramble for anti-Russia ‘drone wall’ hits political, technical hurdles”. Reuters, 15 October 2025.
Hidalgo, C., “Drones are changing the face of war and attracting multi-million dollar investments”. El Pais, 18 October 2025.
Kirichenko a, D., “Ukraine’s Drone War Over the Black Sea Is Heating Up”. The National Interest, 14 October 2025.
Kirichenko b, D.,“Ever-Faster Weapon Cycles: Innovation and Economics in the War in Ukraine”. ASPI Strategist, 16 September 2025.
Kurtanidze, L., Toliashvili, S., The Black Sea: Europe’s Strategic Frontier and the EU’s Emerging Maritime Vision. Bruges: College of Europe, 2025.
Pfeifer, S., “Defence-Tech Startups Boom Amid Ukraine War”. The Financial Times, 14 October 2025.
Pugent, A., “EXCLUSIVE: European Investment Bank ready to invest in drone defence”. EURACTIV, 9 October 2025.
Pugent, A., Cohen, C., “Commission seeks new funding ideas to surge EU drone production”. EURACTIV, 6 October 2025.
WSF Reflections
General Reflections
The study trip to attend the Warsaw Security Forum (WSF) was a deeply insightful experience, allowing us to engage in and listen to discussions of leading experts, and the chance to reflect on European policy challenges in real time.
The weekend meetings ahead of the Forum stood out as one of the highlights. These smaller sessions with invited experts and Fletcher alumni created space for genuine exchange. Conversations were wide-ranging, covering defence, diplomacy, and regional policy (among others) and it was refreshing to see how participants’ different research and professional interests intersected. Further, the pre-Forum events allowed the group to integrate and learn from each other’s specific interest areas.
The flexibility of the program was another major strength. While the structure was clear and well organised, participants could still tailor their experience depending on their interests and backgrounds. From the hotel to the restaurant choices and logistics, everything was handled with care and efficiency, which made the trip run smoothly and allowed us to focus on the substance of the discussions.
That said, there were a few challenges. The WSF itself was somewhat fragmented, with multiple panels running at once with varying start times. Besides making it difficult to prioritise events, this made it hard for the group to move together, which resulted in a very individual experience. Access to smaller, closed-door side events was also limited; these seemed to be where some of the more insightful and policy-relevant discussions took place. As a result, it felt like at times, we were missing out on deeper engagement opportunities.
Overall, though, the trip was extremely well organised and rewarding. The combination of expert meetings, informal dinners, and the Forum itself, made for a rich learning experience and a great chance to strengthen connections within the Fletcher community.
Bennett Murray, MALD ’26
I was delighted by the opportunity to travel to Warsaw with the Fletcher delegation in September 2025. On the logistical side, everything was very well prepared and of great quality. I especially enjoyed the generous culinary opportunities provided to us.
Our day tour of Warsaw was especially well arranged. I would recommend using the same guide on future trips to Warsaw.
The main event of the trip itself was an extremely interesting accessory to my studies at the Fletcher School. As a student with both a professional and academic focus on the war in Ukraine, I found myself at the heart of the transatlantic policy discussion surrounding my focus. This included key seeing key decisionmakers such as Keith Kellogg, Donald Tusk, and ministers from throughout Europe.
I especially appreciated the discussions on the defense industrial sector. I especially enjoyed a panel featuring Oleksandr Yakovenko, the CEO of TAF Industries, which is one of the primary producers of FPV drones in Ukraine. He spoke of the fact that he was reluctantly spending much of his time in Hong Kong to pursue Chinese components for his products. While China-source components are geopolitically unideal for a Ukrainian company in light of Beijing’s policies toward Russia, he nonetheless cannot find alternatives in allied countries.
I also had the opportunity to shake hands with Nate Vance. The first cousin of the U.S. Vice President, Vance spent almost three years fighting in Ukraine as an international volunteer. He spoke of his experiences on the frontline, providing a perspective that was rare among the speakers at WSF. He also spoke of his meetings with his first cousin in the months following the January inauguration, providing a glimpse into the mentality of the vice president.
Another highlight was a panel featuring Bill Browder, Toomas Hendrik Ilves, Zhanna Nemtsova, and Arseniy Yatsenyuk. The somewhat heated discussion involved debate on the proper course of action to take with regards to frozen Russian assets held within European financial institutions.Overall, the Warsaw trip was an unforgettable experience that deepened my understanding of transatlantic policy and defense innovation amid the ongoing war in Ukraine. The mix of firsthand perspectives and high-level dialogue provided a rare opportunity to see how theory meets practice in real-world policymaking. Beyond the panels and formal discussions, the informal exchanges were equally valuable, offering insight into how diverse actors approach shared challenges. I left Warsaw with a renewed appreciation for the complexity of sustaining unity across democratic societies and for the critical role that emerging defense industries play in shaping Europe’s future security landscape. The trip not only complemented my studies at Fletcher but also reinforced my professional commitment to understanding how technology, industry, and strategy intersect in modern warfare. It was, in every sense, an inspiring and intellectually rewarding journey.
J.P. Green, MALD ’27
Strategic Strength, Political Strain: Poland’s Balancing Act on NATO’s Eastern Flank
Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Poland has emerged as one of Europe’s powerhouses in regard to European security. Poland’s geography, defense spending, strong economy, and political will, have placed the country as the hub of NATO’s eastern flank. Poland’s strategic achievements have transformed Poland into a regional provider of deterrence, logistics, and defense industrial capacity. While Poland sits as a prominent security actor at the forefront of NATO, its ability to sustain a consistent long term security policy is dependent on its unstable political grounding. As it stands, Poland remains divided with nationalist conservatives and pro-EU liberals. Within the last 10 years Poland has had its fair share of democratic backsliding[i] from state capture of public media, to significantly weakening judicial independence, much to the dismay of the EU. If Poland is to remain strong against Russian aggression, it must maintain not only its arms and alliances, but it also must maintain its democracy within.
The political divide today and the past erosion of Poland’s democracy could have several consequences for Poland’s role as a security hub and therefore NATO’s ability to maintain a secure Europe. First, there is the matter of policy inconsistency. Poland’s government has a president for the head of state and a prime minister for the head of government. Poland’s recent presidential elections have split the country putting a nationalist conservative president, a Eurosceptic now with the power to veto legislation, at odds with a pro-EU government. This has often resulted in one party trying to undo the other’s policies in an attempt to score political points among their divided constituents. For example, in August 2025, President Nawrocki vetoed aid to Ukrainian refugees[ii] from Tusk’s government and has resurfaced historical grievances between Poland and Ukraine[iii]. This has major implications on the relationship between Poland and Ukraine as Ukraine goes through its war. There is a clear opposing of ideas for the future of Poland. Frequent shifts in tone in conjunction with legislative gridlock risks confusing allies and partners.
In addition, The U.S. and NATO rely on Poland as a stable logistics and forward-deployment site. While NATO operates by consensus, the stark division between the two Polish parties in power could allow one party to obstruct policies it dislikes affecting trust among allies, prolonging decisions, and undermining its legitimacy. This also highlights vulnerabilities as polarized societies are more vulnerable to disinformation and foreign interference, something Russia exploits frequently.
While Poland has experienced some democratic backsliding, recent trends from 2023 under a Tusk government have shown a partial democratic recovery. This is evidenced by its reforms in public media as well as Poland’s ability to unblock 137 billion euros in recovery and cohesion funds that had been denied to Poland by the EU[iv]. In addition, Poland remains strongly supportive of NATO and is anti-Russian across party lines. However, consistent and long-term institutional polarization means slower progress, and future elections could easily reverse reforms.
Poland’s growth as a military power is one of NATO’s greatest strengths, but its democratic instability remains a potential liability. The strength of NATO lies not just in tanks or troops but in shared governance standards that ensure transparency, stability, and unity. If Poland’s internal politics once again slide toward authoritarianism, it could undermine trust with its allies, complicate strategic ties, and encourage adversaries seeking to exploit divisions. The future of NATO’s eastern flank depends as much on Warsaw’s democracy as on its army bases and artillery.
Reflection
It was an honor to be part of Fletcher’s delegation to The Warsaw Security Forum of 2025. The two day conference had multiple themes that largely centered around European and NATO unity, building preventative measures, drone warfare, and dealing with hybrid threats. In addition, the conference had an impressive amount of world leaders ranging from Jens Stoltenberg, Donald Tusk, Volodymyr Zelensky, and more discussing important policy issues and the future of NATO. While it was fascinating to see world leaders I often see on tv give speeches, I would consistently hear the same talking points around slogans such as “Europe needs to be strong” and “together we are stronger”. What added to the speeches were the roundtables, questions from the audience, and networking breaks that I found drove conversations, and guided the event into more specific actionable items from weapons manufacturing, internal politics, and more. The networking tables also contributed greatly to my learning. The forum had people from all different kinds of backgrounds which I was proud to see. In addition to the conference, I really enjoyed the dinners with Fletcher alumni and discussions with academics and journalists. It was extremely insightful to see how others saw the world and how they used their craft to draw meaningful insights about the state of the world we live in today. Overall the Warsaw Security Forum 2025 trip was a great learning experience that I was proud to be a part of and contribute to.
[i] Csaky, Zselyke . 2024. “The Difficulties of Restoring Democracy in Poland.” Centre for European Reform. 2024. https://www.cer.eu/insights/difficulties-restoring-democracy-poland.
[ii] Service, RFE/RL’s Ukrainian. 2025. “Polish President’s Decision to Veto Aid to Ukrainian Refugees Prompts Political Storm.” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty. RFE/RL. August 27, 2025. https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-poland-nawrocki-tusk-refugees-trzaskowski/33514064.html.
[iii] “As Nawrocki Becomes Polish President, Grievances with Ukraine Resurface: Why History Still Divides Warsaw and Kyiv?” 2025. Links. August 23, 2025. https://links.org.au/nawrocki-becomes-polish-president-grievances-ukraine-resurface-why-history-still-divides-warsaw-and.
[iv] “Brussels Moves to Close Rule of Law Procedure against Poland.” 2024. Euronews. May 6, 2024. https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2024/05/06/brussels-moves-to-close-rule-of-law-procedure-against-poland.