Georgia’s Foreign Agents Law and Democracy
By Rosalinde Nebiolo, MALD 2025 Candidate, The Fletcher School
The new foreign agents law passed in Georgia in May 2024 has led thousands of citizens to protest and has sparked concern among Western policymakers. On May 17, 2024, the Fletcher Russia and Eurasia Program held an online panel discussion to assess the law and how it might impact Georgia’s domestic politics and foreign policy.
The panelists included Maia Otarashvili, the director of the Eurasia Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute; Almut Rochowanski, a civil society activist across post-Soviet countries; Maxim Krupskiy, an international human rights lawyer and former visiting scholar of the Fletcher Russia and Eurasia Program; Victor Kipiani, chair of the Georgian think tank Geocase; Eto Buziashvili, a research associate for the Caucasus at the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab; and Anatol Lieven, the director of the Eurasia Program at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft.
The panelists highlighted the ongoing context surrounding the law in their remarks. Otarashvili discussed other bills recently brought forth by the ruling Georgian Dream party, such as a law from April 19, 2024, which allows people to move assets into Georgia tax-free from offshore accounts. She claimed these bills undermine democracy in Georgia.
Otarashvili stated, “Georgian people and the Georgian system were supposed to guarantee the safety of Oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili’s money,” but that safety has increasingly been threatened by Georgia’s aspiration to European Union integration.
Buziashvili echoed this sentiment, saying that the Georgian Dream party may also be pushing the legislation forward as it feels a threat to the regime’s survival. “The intent of this law is to punish dissent and to punish any undesirable individual. To use the law to punish, one needs total control of institutions, and this is the case for various Georgian institutions.”
Krupskiy highlighted the legal concerns surrounding the bill, noting, “the quality of this law, in terms of the rule of law, differs significantly [from those in other countries].” He explained that the law lacks clear criteria, which could lead to abuse by government forces. “If the law assumes that receiving foreign funding automatically means the fulfillment of foreign will or foreign interests in the absence of any evidence, then such a law cannot be recognized as fair law.”
Kipiani also acknowledged the potential shortfalls of the bill and how being labeled a foreign agent could create a risky situation for both organizations and individuals. “It’s about stigma and labeling–not just recipients, but donors as well.” Kipiani pointed out that although the bill does not specifically target individuals, people are required by the bill to cooperate fully and even share personal data if necessary.
Rochowanski critiqued Georgian NGOs, which are increasingly involved in the political sphere to the detriment of their work’s neutrality. Rochowanski explained that unlike in other post-Soviet states, NGOs are so entrenched in Georgia’s public sphere that law-making has become a relationship between NGOs and the government, excluding citizens. The Georgian Dream party was content with this status quo until recently.
Both Rochowanski and Lieven believe that the role of the EU is complicated, although not limited. Rochanowski stated that the situation “illustrates that an EU that wants to be a geopolitical actor will cease to be a normative actor.”
Lieven stated that the “question of legitimacy of this law should be a question for the European Court of Justice” and that the EU should “insist on the strongest possible monitoring” for the upcoming Georgian parliamentary elections. Although he agreed there were problematic aspects of the bill, he emphasized that the Georgian population should communicate their public opinion through a vote and not aggressive action.