How Much Omnibalancing Will There Be in 2024?

U.S. foreign policy could play a significant role in the 2024 election. That could lead to some perverse strategies by domestic and international actors.

By Daniel Drezner, Professor of International Politics at The Fletcher School at Tufts University

As the United States has become more politically polarized, the opportunities for omnibalancing in foreign policy have increased. Omnibalancing is when a polity is fractured enough such that domestic actors prefer to ally with foreign actors as a means of staying in or acquiring power. As I suggested back in 2017 and again in 2018, Democrats and Republicans in the United States have diverged so much that some actors might choose to seek favor from foreign interests as a means of sabotaging the opposition party. Furthermore, because there are such stark differences in foreign policy preferences and policy competence between the two parties, foreign leaders are incentivized to take actions that help or harm one of the major party candidates. 

The possibility of omnibalancing is tied to another, more unexpected trend: the seeming correlation between Biden’s approval rating and foreign policy crises. This is surprising to the hard-working staff here at Drezner’s World, who in the past have stressed that Americans do not care enough about foreign policy for it to matter electorally. Still, a quick glance at FiveThirtyEight reveals that Biden’s approval initially went under water during the Afghanistan withdrawal, and the war in Gaza has hurt him as well.1 Maybe, like with Obama back in the day, voters approve of Biden’s policy outputs but not the policy outcomes. 

The point is, foreign policy sure seems to affect Biden’s popularity. And as 2024 approaches, it is easy to see how multiple actors, both domestic and foreign, might find an incentive to mess with Biden.

Consider how the war in Gaza is, among other things hurting Biden’s popularity. The latest New York Times poll suggests that Biden is suffering because younger Americans think he’s too supportive of Israel while older Americans think he is not supportive enough: 

Voters broadly disapprove of the way President Biden is handling the bloody strife between Israelis and Palestinians, a New York Times/Siena College poll has found, with younger Americans far more critical than older voters of both Israel’s conduct and of the administration’s response to the war in Gaza.

Voters are also sending decidedly mixed signals about the direction U.S. policy-making should take as the war in Gaza grinds into its third month, with Israelis still reeling from the Oct. 7 terrorist attack, thousands of Palestinian deaths in Gaza and the Biden administration trying to pressure Israel to scale back its military campaign. Nearly as many Americans want Israel to continue its military campaign as want it to stop now to avoid further civilian casualties.

As Nate Cohn points out, the most striking element of that survey is that younger voters now support Trump over Biden: “Mr. Trump is winning 21 percent of young Biden ’20 voters who sympathize more with Palestinians than Israel, while winning 12 percent of other young Biden ’20 voters. In an even more striking sign of defections among his own supporters, Mr. Biden holds just a 64-24 lead among the young Biden ’20 voters who say Israel is intentionally killing civilians, compared with an 84-8 lead among the Biden ’20 voters who don’t think Israel is intentionally killing civilians.”

Semafor’s Dave Weigel notes that this creates some perverse incentives for Benjamin Netanyahu: “The incentives here for Bibi/Likud are just fantastic. 1) If Trump is president, you get whatever you want. 2) If a Democrat is president, you get whatever you want from Congress while his coalition peels apart over Israel and Trump comes back.” 

This does raise an interesting question: would Bibi prolong the conflict in Gaza as a means of dragging Biden down further and bringing back Trump? He is extremely unpopular in Israel right now, and as previously noted, unpopular leaders often take risks to gamble for resurrection. Might Netanyahu try to replace Biden, who has started voicing qualms about Bibi’s leadership, alter tactics to rally his right-wing baseand bring down Biden’s popularity enough to bring back Trump? 

I would grade this as “doubtful.” For one thing, it’s not obvious that Trump would be better for Netanyahu. If only Nixon can go to China, then only Trump can tell Netanyahu to fuck off. Trump’s criticism of Netanyahu in the immediate aftermath of the Hamas attack further hints that his immature instinct is to cut off Netanyahu at the knees. Furthermore, it is far from clear that Netanyahu can last as prime minister until November 2024. 

No doubt, Netanyahu is frustrated with Biden’s jawboning and would prefer unqualified support from the U.S. president. Given Trump’s mercurial nature, however, that is insufficient incentive for him to prolong the conflict. 

The other omnibalancing possibility comes from the congressional wing of the GOP. Back in August the Biden administration requested a supplemental aid package for Ukraine. After many months of House drama stalled out any negotiations, Republicans decided to link any aid negotiations to border security. 

A few weeks ago Senate Republicans — who are far more pro-Ukraine than their House counterparts — pitched a hissy fit about the Biden administration’s failure to take questions about the Southern border seriously.2 GOP senators have explicitly linked any vote on Ukraine aid to funding for the border.  Multiple reports this week make it clear that while negotiations continue, no deal will be reached until Congress reconvenes in January. 

From an omnibalancing perspective, GOP members of Congress have an incentive not to agree to any deal in 2024 as well. This is for two reasons. First, they perceive border security as a winning issue and the last thing you want with a winning issue is to solve it before an election.3

Second, Republicans who support Trump would prefer that if a Ukrainian collapse happens, it does so under Biden’s watch. If Trump is elected and cuts off aid Ukraine, the country would likely lose its war with Russia. Any images of Ukrainian surrender would hit the sitting president’s standing in the same way that Biden’s popularity took a hit during the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan. For Republicans, the political optics would be much better if Ukraine sued for peace under Biden. And if no more U.S. aid is authorized for Ukraine, then that could deleteriously affect morale and trigger an earlier collapse. This is what I have heard from Biden administration officials and it’s what others have heard as well. Republicans could even justify it as reflecting shifts in public opinion. 

So will congressional Republicans stymie the Biden administration’s efforts to support Ukraine? I honestly do not know. Most congressional Republicans, particularly in the Senate, still want to support Ukraine and oppose Russia’s land grab. The thing is, most Republicans also do not want Joe Biden to be re-elected. 

This seems like an excellent test of just how much Republicans are willing to prioritize partisan interests over national security interests. I certainly hope a deal is struck in January — but I am far from certain it will happen.

1 Maybe it’s that the foreign policy news creates a permission structure for voters to turn on Biden for other reasons. But I’d be happy to have my Americanist colleagues correct me if I am wrong. 

2 Why do I say it was a hissy fit? Because if the reporting is accurate, GOP senators were irate that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not discuss the border even though that’s not his job. Last I checked that is a matter for the Department of Homeland Security. 

3 After 40 years of campaigning about overturning Roe v. Wade, Republicans succeeded in their goal. It hasn’t gone well for them since.

(This post is republished from Drezner’s World.)