In Europe, Realism Already Trump(s) Liberal Idealism
By Vasilis Petropoulos, Research Fellow at the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy and Fletcher Alum
If his first tenure offered the Europeans any necessary reality check it was the disillusionment with the viability of their dependence on the United States.
The reverberations of Donald Trump’s forthcoming presidency have already started to crystallize into tangible manifestations on the international scene. Guided by past record, campaign statements, and cabinet appointments, key actors recalibrate their policies in anticipation of Trump 2.0. Curiously, these policy shifts are more salient among U.S. allies than among adversaries. From Brussels to Kyiv, Trump’s return to the Oval office seems to breathe new life into the need for sheer pragmatism, which gradually overshadows stringent adherence to legitimate yet unrealistic, and unsustainable in the long term, foreign policy choices.
Revisiting the transatlantic dependencies
The values-based nature of the Euro-American partnership is unfailingly touted in both sides of the Atlantic. Apart from geopolitically warranted, economically wise, and culturally dictated the transatlantic bond is one founded upon shared principles forged in the crucible of two World Wars and entrenched amid the ensuing ideological struggle that pitted the West (“Free World”) against the totalitarian Soviet Union and its satellites. The effortless political convergence between the U.S. and Europe has had an undeniable positive impact on their all-weather alliance. From automating mutual understanding, facilitating compromises and consensus-building, and warding off lingering gridlocks to preserving the NATO Alliance after the removal of the Soviet threat in the end of the Cold War, the common Western values appeared to be the sticking glue that kept the transatlantic partners together in critical times. But for all their undisputed merit, they had another- far from positive – effect: they rendered Europe complacent and erroneously convinced that ideological kinship alone suffices to keep all the other aspects of the transatlantic partnership intact. European capitals took American power and its being employed in the service of their interests- almost unconditionally- for granted.
Enters Trump in 2017. If his first tenure offered the Europeans any necessary reality check it was the disillusionment with the viability of their dependence on the United States. Public criticism against Europe’s then-reliance on Russian energy imports, threats to NATO partners that they would face the U.S. withdrawal from the alliance unless they increase their defense spending, tariffs levied on EU imports in 2018 all painted a picture of a new transatlantic dynamic surfacing. For the first time exhibited so conspicuously, Europe was not the United States’ best friend benignantly enjoying the privileges this friendship entailed; it was a U.S. ally who, acting as a “free-rider” to the detriment of American taxpayers, was taking advantage of Washington’s good will getting richer on the back of U.S. commitments and security guarantees. But EU leaders treated Trump as a temporary nuisance, his complaints to be delicately managed until 2020 rather than deemed signals for a long-term course correction. Expecting that with the end of Trump’s presidency the transatlantic ties would go back to factory settings, Europe deluded itself into thinking that reforming was not indispensable. Defense budgets did not go up, technological innovation noted sluggish progress, imports and exports diversification wasn’t followed through, while desire for firmer cohesion and EU-wide military coordination remained lip service.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 did come as a wake-up call but only went so far. Moscow’s bid to forcibly redraw the map of Eastern Europe reminded Brussels the brittleness of peace and inadvertently re-emphasized NATO’s relevance. It did little, however, to change the security perception of Europe vis-à-vis its dependence on Washington. In a European conflict whose outcome is cardinal for the security of the EU in that, if Ukraine were to fall, EU countries could well be next, the U.S. has shouldered the bulk of the military aid sent to embattled Kyiv. EU partners have tried to do their part, but even some of the most vital weaponry they have delivered, such as the F-16 fighter jets, is U.S. made. With Washington taking the lead again as Europe’s security provider, the Europeans did not feel any particular rush to modernize and become capable of fending for themselves militarily. Their sense of agency was channeled into, and confined to, breaking away from their energy reliance on Russia, as well as individually increasing (albeit not all) their defense budgets close to the 2% NATO threshold. Serious talk on political level about European military self-sufficiency remained largely vague and limited.
Tables have turned though. Before it has even started, Trump’s second term seems to finally trigger Europe’s long-needed shift to a more pragmatic approach with respect to its security. Since the U.S. pre-election period, when polls were showing a neck-to-neck battle between Harris and Trump, Europe has come to terms with the reality that the President-elect’s views are not just the circumstantial products of an evanescent fashion but reflect systemic mutations within the American society poised to affect U.S. foreign policy towards Europe even in the post-Trump years.
The Draghi report, published in September 2024, set the tone for the concrete steps required for the materialization of the European ‘strategic autonomy’. Central to the report are calls for increased defense spending, enhanced collaboration within the EU on military procurement, and a turn to European weapons markets with an aim to stimulate technological innovation through stronger demand. What preceded the report’s publication was the appointment of the first-ever EU Commissioner for Defense with the unenviable task of fostering the cohesion and standardization of the European military industrial base navigating EU members’ resistance and reconciling their different priorities along the way. In the same spirit, the grandiose project of a European air defense system or ‘European Iron Dome’ (formally known as the European Sky Shield Initiative), an idea floated around since 2022, is gaining steam anew. So is the notion that Europe should harness its economic resources and human capital to transform into a global hub of technological innovation, especially in the fields of such critical technologies as advanced semiconductors, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and cloud services, domains in which Europe’s dependence on the U.S. is also striking. President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen drew attention to these areas in a speech delivered at the World Future Forum in Lisbon, interestingly on November 5, 2024, that is on the American Election Day. Earlier this month, it was NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte who picked up the baton of awakening Europe in his first major policy speech as the new chief of the Alliance at Carnegie Europe. Addressing directly the European members of NATO, he urged them to adopt a wartime mindset accelerating defense production and ramping up defense spending to exceed the 2% benchmark hinting at, though not yet numerically defining, a new alliance-wide threshold. “From Brussels, it takes one day to drive to Ukraine”, Rutte starkly reminded and continued by emphasizing the widening gap between Europe’s military capabilities and those of Russia and China issuing a stern warning: “Russia and China are racing ahead. We risk lagging behind. This is very dangerous”. Nowhere in his speech did he mention the U.S. security guarantees or Article 5. Nor did he refer to the U.S. nuclear umbrella. That’s not because these commitments have loosened in any way, at least for the time being, but because their continuation is contingent upon the next U.S. Administration and focus should be given on how Europe can stand for itself in (the remote) case they be removed. The miniscule probability of such a scenario does nothing to make the risk more palatable when at stake is the very survival of Europe.
It is evident that both the possibility of Trump’s comeback during the pre-election period and his actual return to power on November 5 have generated a palpable wind of change that’s leading to clearly delineated policy recommendations in the direction of a more robust and self-reliant Europe. What’s also telling of the seriousness of Europe’s turn is that this time the discussions about a militarily strong, self-reliant Europe are neither hazy wishful thinking nor are they occurring at the fringes of Brussels’ policymaking ecosystem; this time they are initiated by the European political leadership on the highest echelons.
Zelensky’s U-turn
In Ukraine, wartime leader Volodymyr Zelensky is watching warily as the new administration prepares to take its seat at the White House. While Trump’s Ukraine policy is still an enigma, Zelensky anticipates a much different approach than that implemented unflinchingly by Biden. And rightly so. The appointments of Ukraine critics in top positions of the new administration (including in the vice presidency), coupled with Trump’s pledges to end the war swiftly as soon as he becomes president, have raised eyebrows in Kyiv. Further, the nomination by Trump of retired General Keith Kellogg as the U.S. special peace envoy to Ukraine has understandably linked the president-elect to the latter’s peace plan for the Russia-Ukraine war, which, among others, foresees the ‘freezing’ of Ukraine’s NATO membership for a protracted period in exchange for Russian security guarantees; suggests a cease-fire within the status quo currently existing on the ground; and makes U.S. military aid contingent upon Kyiv’s participation in peace negotiations. Compounding Zelensky’s worries is Trump’s frequently spelled out aversion towards spending U.S. money on military aid abroad. Tech mogul Elon Musk, rapidly turning into Trump’s top confidant, mirrored this aversion wryly when he publicly crowned Zelensky as the greatest champion of money heist in history referring to the amount of money Ukrainian president has received from the U.S. to repel the Russian invasion.
It is not surprising then that weeks after Trump’s electoral victory Zelensky felt compelled to soften his stance regarding a cease-fire with Russia. In what can be construed as an about-face, Zelensky abandoned his long-held commitment that Ukraine would not partake in any form of peace negotiations unless Russia completely withdrew from all the occupied territories. He instead declared he would be open to cease-fire talks even if Russia still occupies Ukrainian land on the condition that the Ukrainian-controlled territory accede to NATO as a formal full member. As far as the Russian-seized territories are concerned, Zelensky vaguely deferred the matter for future consideration saying that Ukraine will seek their return ‘in a diplomatic way’. This possibly is diplomatic parlance for writing off these territories; at least as they stood in the status quo ante bellum, that is as fully incorporated Ukrainian soil. But even if a diplomatic solution entailing the return of Russian-occupied areas could materialize in the future, such a negotiation would require concessions to Moscow that have so far been unimaginable (e.g. codified security guarantees by NATO).
Back to the present, Zelensky seems to realize that demanding the withdrawal of Russian troops from Eastern Ukraine as a prerequisite for talks is an elusive end to chase against the backdrop of the administration change in Washington. Sadly, Russia has entrenched its foothold in a vast part of the East, especially around Mariupol, Donetsk, Luhansk, and Crimea, and keeps pushing westwards. Buoyed by his like-minded friends, notably China, Iran and North Korea, Putin has showed no signs of backing down even in the face of crippling sanctions and unexpected setbacks in the battlefield. Russia’s allies enable both the replenishment of troops and weapons and the survival of the Russian economy which, against the odds, has been kept afloat. However heartbreaking they might seem, the above facts are real and make for Ukraine’s current predicament. In these circumstances, it is hard to imagine Putin agreeing to abandon the territories his army controls as a condition for peace talks. Priding himself as a closer, Trump was not likely to let Zelensky’s unrealistic insistence stand in the way of a much needed- both politically and from a humanitarian perspective- cease-fire. The Ukrainian president was quick to anticipate this, sparing himself the uncomfortable position of being strong-armed by the U.S. into negotiating with Russia. This re-calibration does not mean appeasement. Zelensky seems to adopt a more pragmatic approach whereby peace becomes plausible after three years of uninterrupted fighting, while continued Western support maintains a strong Ukraine with more gravitas at the negotiations table. The continuation of this support is of paramount importance as it hands Ukraine enough bargaining chips to avoid a position of weakness vis-à-vis Russia.
Conclusion
The possibility of Trump’s return has jolted the EU and Ukraine into action, prompting strategic recalibrations that were long overdue. For the EU, the prospect of diminished U.S. support has accelerated steps toward strategic autonomy, potentially reshaping the transatlantic relationship. For Ukraine, the shift necessitates a delicate balancing act- pursuing pragmatic diplomacy while ensuring continued Western support. While the road ahead is fraught with challenges, these developments underscore a pivotal reality: dependence on a single actor, even one as historically steadfast as the United States, cannot be perennial and is unsustainable in a rapidly evolving geopolitical landscape. In a changing world where aggressors and assertive strongmen can never stay consigned into oblivion, no free nation affords to commit the fatal mistake of complacency. Rather, survival is a constant struggle that has to be fought with one’s own means lest the dependence that once made sense as a perceived strategic one-way street abruptly turn into a slippery slope. Both the EU and Ukraine are beginning to chart paths that reflect this new understanding, marking the dawn of a new era of self-reliance, strategic resilience, and calculated, non-defeatist pragmatism.
(This post is republished from Tovima.)