J.D. Vance Nomination Puts Europe on Notice

By Peter Rough, Fletcher alumnus and Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute

To the news of former President Trump’s selection of Sen. JD Vance (R-Ohio) as his running mate, Western pundits and politicians alike reacted as if the end of U.S. support for Ukraine was all but a fait accompli. One senior European Union official called the pick a “disaster,” while an American news outlet published an article titled “God help Ukraine.”

There is no doubt Vance is one of the most strident opponents of aid to Ukraine. He is committed to “America First” and whip-smart by any measure. His selection as the Republican nominee for vice president is an important block in the broader mosaic that would emerge as the foreign policy of a second Trump administration.

Instead of handwringing, however, the wise course for Europe would be to move now to shore up its own defense capabilities and pull its own weight inside NATO.

European allies have improved their military capabilities, but they must redouble their efforts. Today, 23 of 32 NATO allies spend 2 percent of their gross domestic product on defense, an enormous improvement over just a few short years ago. But that benchmark no longer matches the moment.

Russia is on the march in Ukraine. If the Trump-Vance ticket emerges victorious in November’s presidential election, voices from both the “Make America Great Again” elements of the Republican Party and the more traditional conservative internationalists in the GOP will ask more of Europe. As Vance told the Republican convention in Milwaukee, “We will make sure our allies share in the burden of securing world peace.”

This sets up a grand bargain: If major European allies spend at levels that yield actual large-scale combat forces and carry the brunt of military support for Ukraine — including by floating meaningful security guarantees — Donald Trump will be more likely to continue the balancing act that has been the defining element of his approach to Ukraine. He employed this approach during the spring 2024 debate over the national security supplemental, when he maintained a quiet reserve and allowed disparate Republican voices to have their say before tacitly green-lighting House Speaker Mike Johnson’s (R-La.) effort to pass the legislation.

In a second Trump administration, Vance would partner in the Cabinet with many of the same national security hawks who played a significant role in advancing that legislation. As Vance acknowledged to the party faithful in Milwaukee, “We have a big tent on this party, on everything from national security to economic policy.”

This attempt to balance competing interests within the party is a hallmark of Trumpian politics. And if Trump does win a second term, it will be Trump who calls the shots.

Vance is no doubt aware of this. As a Marine veteran of the Iraq War, he has repeatedly emphasized his commitment to the chain of command. To be sure, Trump’s decision to elevate Vance puts the senator in pole position to lead the “Make America Great Again” movement in 2028 and beyond. But so long as he is president, Trump will command the stage as the decider.

What counsel Vance will offer Trump is no secret. Just look at what Vance has said. While his remarks at the February 2024 Munich Security Conference made headlines for rocking the boat and questioning the future of American aid to Ukraine, Vance himself made clear that he believed a strong Europe was in America’s best interests, prefacing his remarks with words of support. “I offer this in the spirit of friendship, not in the spirit of criticism,” he said, “because, no, I don’t think that we should pull out of NATO, and no, I don’t think that we should abandon Europe.”

Vance went on to say that he believes the U.S. should pivot to Asia, and to suggest that the successful defense of Europe requires a greater commitment from Europe itself. This is an attitude Europeans can build on. Vance, like the man who chose him to join the Republican ticket, believes that Europe’s NATO member states must do more to provide for their own defense: 2 percent of GDP might have worked when that pledge was first made at the alliance’s Wales summit in 2014. But more is required in the current era of Russian revanchism and Chinese saber-rattling.

Now that Germany has spent the 100 billion euro supplemental it established in the days after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, for example, Berlin will need to make sacrifices to sustain its defense spending increases.

If the Trump-Vance ticket wins, there will be a review process for Europe policy as the new national security team settles into the White House and finds it bearings. Now is the time for Europe to set budgets in favor of military power and to design a path forward for Ukraine. Instead of lamenting a new administration come January, Europe should be ready to impress it.

(This post is republished from the Hudson Institute.)