Military analyst: Russia and Ukraine are accelerating the drone race

Port in Ust-Luga, oil terminal in the Bryansk region: drones of the Armed Forces of Ukraine attack the energy infrastructure of the Russian Federation. DW talked about the role of UAVs in the war with CNA expert Samuel Bendett.

By Mikhail Bushuev, featuring Samuel Bendett (Bendett is an alumnus of The Fletcher School and an Adjunct Senior Fellow with the Center for a New American Security)

Ukrainian drones, for the first time, struck two strikes in the Leningrad region, including the port in Ust-Luga, causing damage to the Novatek gas terminal on January 21. Earlier, drones of the Armed Forces of Ukraine attacked the oil terminal in the Bryansk region. The geography and types of targets of Ukrainian UAVs are changing from low-priority to more significant targets – such as important infrastructure facilities in Russia, says Samuel Bendett, a researcher at the Washington Center for Naval Analysis (CNA), who studies the Russian military-industrial complex, in particular, the field of robotics and unmanned flying systems.

DW: The fire in Ust-Luga strained the oil and gas sector not only in Russia but also in international markets. Ukrainian drones attacked the most important Russian port for the first time and twice hit the region, which has not yet been the target of attacks – the Leningrad region. What do you think in that regard?

Samuel Bendett: What was expected for a long time has happened. It is obvious that strikes against the energy and industrial infrastructure that feeds and supports military action are absolutely necessary. Ukraine has already demonstrated that it can attack civilian objects throughout Russia, including Moscow and the Kremlin. But these are low-priority goals because they do not affect the real reaction of society to the war because most of the Russian society has come to terms with this conflict.

At the moment, Ukraine has chosen a strategy to respond with a blow to a blow. If Russia strikes at Ukrainian infrastructure – energy facilities and industrial enterprises, Ukraine must demonstrate that it can strike at key Russian infrastructure. If something happens to the oil and energy terminals in Russia, it will also affect society. But still, the main goal is to destroy the industrial infrastructure that supports military action.

– If we evaluate the situation with drones in this war as a whole, what are the most important trends you would highlight?

– We are approaching the two-year anniversary of this bloody invasion. A lot has changed in two years. What we are witnessing now is a rapid increase in the number of FPV drones (FPV – “first-person view”; these are devices that transmit the physical reality surrounding them to a remote operator as virtual reality). We are witnessing the evolution of FPV drones towards their complexity – they can fly long distances, carry more explosives, and can be, to some extent, resistant to electronic warfare (EB).

We observe experiments with artificial intelligence (AI) and machine vision (an algorithm that allows the drone to hold the target in the crosshairs automatically and move in its direction) on FPV drones. This was discussed recently in several articles, for example, Sergey Flash (Ukrainian serviceman and communication specialist Sergey Beskrestnov, pseudonym “Flash.” – Ed.). He and other Ukrainians are concerned that the use of AI in drones can bring the war to a completely different level.

What else we are seeing is the development of both Ukrainian and Russian culture of high-tech industrial startups, as well as a rapid increase in technological breakthroughs, which are facilitated by small developers on both sides. In Ukraine, obviously, such discoveries are welcomed more, including because of the better integration of such startups with the government, although, again, to a limited extent, as we understand from recent Ukrainian comments.

– And what’s going on in Russia?

– On the Russian side, there are also many powerful, established volunteer initiatives that help to raise funds and produce drones for military use – this is true for short-range drones. In the medium range, the Russian industry has demonstrated that its main models, such as the Lancet, Orlan-30, Orlan-10, and ZALA drones, are actually very powerful and very complex weapons, which, according to Ukrainians, creates many problems for them. There is a constant improvement of the same “lancets”: there are models with a longer range, a more powerful warhead, and the possible use of AI.

Ukraine does not produce anything similar, for example, to ZALA, “Lancets” or “Orlany”. I think this is one of the acute problems for the Ukrainian army. I often hear from Ukrainian volunteers that they need to choose some of the most successful versions of medium-range UAVs and develop them.

– In other words, Ukraine has a shortage of medium-range drones…

– Yes. As for long-distance travel, the situation has changed for both sides. Russia currently relies heavily on Iran’s Shahed/Geran drones, and the Russian military is now testing the capabilities of such a jet-powered drone. But it is Ukraine that succeeded in creating long-range kamikaze drones, demonstrating that its military-industrial sector, even despite pressure from Russian air strikes, can still produce several types of long-range drones capable of striking deep into Russian territory: “Beaver,” UJ-22, another drone with a jet engine, which was shown about a week ago.

But they are not produced in large quantities. The Russian military-industrial complex, on the contrary, invests a lot of resources in a limited set of models that they can produce in significant quantities. That is why President Zelensky and the Ukrainian government announced stunning figures: Ukraine is going to produce this year a million short-range FPV drones and 10,000 medium- and long-range drones, of which 1,000 are kamikaze UAVs with a range of up to 1000 km.

– Who now produces drones at a higher speed – Ukraine or Russia?

– If we are talking about FPV drones, I think the race is about equal, although, allegedly, Russia produces more drones. In my opinion, the last figure from Ukraine is 50,000 FPV drones released in December. In the Russian Federation, probably, no less of them were produced, at least. But it’s hard to assess because we don’t have a lot of reporting data.

– In his article in The Economist magazine, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Valery Zaluzhny, spoke about the deadlock in the war and added that breakthrough technological innovations could be a way out of it. Do you see something on the horizon?

– Both Ukrainian and Russian observers, military bloggers, and experts are concerned about the imminent appearance of an attacking swarm of drones. Experiments with AI and machine vision can provide more effective resistance to EW systems and improve the ability of such a swarm to fly in a large group. Today, you need an operator for every drone, right? What if the operator can control several drones, a dozen or dozens? Suddenly, the technology may be much more profitable for offensive or, conversely, defensive actions.

So far, everything sounds contradictory: Russian observers, on the one hand, believe that the mass use of FPV on one section of the front can allow them to achieve advantages: to cause damage, destroy equipment and soldiers, and displace them from defensive positions. But at the same time, as we know, everything on the battlefield is under surveillance and can eventually be attacked with enemy FPV drones. And this scenario can work against both Russians and Ukrainians.

So even if the Russian military attempts to break through on one of the sections of the front, the Ukrainian defense can successfully cope with this offensive through FPV drone strikes, right? Ukrainians may not even be on the line of contact but 10-15-20 kilometers further and attack even with the help of long-range drones. We don’t hear about Bayraktars or Orions so often, right? They fly slowly and represent a convenient target for air defense, but they have very good optics. With the help of their cameras and sensors, they can provide good data on the situation on the battlefield while they can be located far beyond the reach of any specific air defense systems.

In Russia, they constantly say that the party that offers solutions on an industrial scale will win. And I think that’s partly true. But what if both sides can adapt in time? Therefore, I think that the stalemate at the front, which Zaluzhny wrote about, is a much longer-term trend, even if we take into account new breakthrough types of weapons, such as swarms of short- or medium-range drones or even robots attacking ahead of soldiers.

– Samuel, it’s no secret that the U.S. has suspended military assistance to Ukraine because of state budget disputes. Can Europeans replace this assistance with regard to drones for a while?

– (negatively shakes his head).

– Can’t they?

– Well, look. The help packages included Switchblade and Phoenix Ghost UAVs. I don’t know how many of them are in operation. No one talks about it; I don’t see any open publications. We do not see evidence of their use on social networks, including Telegram. That doesn’t mean they’re not on the battlefield. But at the same time, it does not seem that Ukraine receives thousands of such drones per month. They probably get in very small quantities.

But perhaps it would be more useful to get protection from UAVs and to have electronic warfare, which, as the Ukrainian government has repeatedly stressed, Ukraine needs and wants to receive from the United States.

– What could be the course of the war this year?

– I think the war will probably be similar to what we have already seen. Even a major technological breakthrough can be responded to with a mirror, parallel technological breakthrough, which can nullify the enemy’s success. The key areas will, it seems to me, be air defense, UAV protection, and electronic warfare. Anyone who comes up with a way to nullify the enemy’s advantage in FPV drones is likely to gain an advantage in this conflict. This is a technological race, where each advanced decision is followed by a counter move, and so on. And we are in the midst of the race.

(This post is translated and republished from DW.)