North Korea’s Combat Troops in Ukraine: What It Means for the West
By Mikhail Troitskiy, Visiting Scholar at the Fletcher Russia and Eurasia Program
Escalatory Choices and Regime Strength: The Sources and Consequences of North Korean Deployments in the Ukraine War – North Korean military presence on Russia’s front lines with Ukraine is increasingly aimed at active combat roles. Initially, Moscow and Pyongyang may have planned to keep this deniable due to uncertainties about the value of deploying a small number of non-Russian-speaking foreign military personnel and potential diplomatic repercussions. Once these deployments were revealed, Russia and North Korea faced a choice: deny the reports as they likely planned, considering the issuance of Russian identity documents to North Korean military personnel, or acknowledge them.
Opting for denial would have required keeping the North Korean deployment limited and wrapping up operations before irrefutable evidence emerged. However, the revelation seemed to empower elements in both Moscow and Pyongyang that favored escalation.
The two emerging allies decided that the reasons to keep the deployments limited had vanished and chose to admit their actions. They have since doubled down on the deployments, leaking more confirmations to the media. Now, North Korean leadership refers to Russia’s war against Ukraine as a “sacred war” that must be won, resonating with Russia’s persistent semi-official nuclear apocalypse rhetoric. Russia is encouraging Europeans, Americans, South Koreans, and others to step into the fray, which would support the Kremlin’s claim that it is fighting a powerful multinational coalition in Ukraine.
The increasing numbers of North Korean military personnel and their growing involvement in combat operations serve the interests of both nations. Initially cautious, Moscow may now sense an opportunity: if North Korean combat forces can be expanded to meaningful levels in the foreseeable future, it could eliminate the need to call up more Russian civilians to fight against Ukraine and signal to adversaries that Russia has access to an almost bottomless source of fighters.
Moreover, if Moscow and Pyongyang can project the image of a successful offensive alliance, they may attract currently reluctant followers, such as Iran, not only to the front lines in Ukraine but also to projects like the Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa Alliance (BRICS), aimed at demonstrating alternatives to the West and a resolve to protect dictators’ interests.
For its part, North Korea has found a new source of cash and combat experience for its elite military units. Its armed forces can now identify the fittest and brightest combat survivors to place in command positions. Both Pyongyang and Moscow may have reasons to be upset with Beijing’s posture: North Korea resents China’s lack of deference to its quest for status and autonomy, and Russia is frustrated with Beijing’s limited willingness to defy Western pressure and unequivocally back its war effort. North Korean fighters in Ukraine represent a setback for China, which seemingly wants to keep its junior partners under close tutelage.
Most importantly, over the past year or so, North Korea has been shifting to a more intransigent posture. It has rhetorically abandoned the goal of Korean unity on Pyongyang’s terms, deployed new weapon systems, resumed ballistic missile launches, and considered fresh nuclear tests.
On this path, overtly aggressive actions in Northeast Asia are too risky for Kim Jong Un due to the preparedness of the United States and its regional allies. This makes Europe an ideal place to test the resolve of North Korea’s adversaries, first and foremost, South Korea and the United States.
Kim Jong Un may also be testing the impact of participating in a shooting war on his regime’s strength. He is vacillating between commitment to the status quo and expansionist actions to raise the stakes. While it may be too risky to attack South Korea or destabilize East Asia, a gambit in Europe appears to be a safer experiment. Domestically, it can be spun as Kim defeating Western imperialists shoulder-to-shoulder with a great-power ally, Russia.
All of this is happening against the backdrop of mounting challenges faced by Ukraine in defending against advancing Russian troops. This is why concern is rising in the West about the possibility of the war becoming further internationalized.
The pressure on Ukraine’s Western partners and U.S. allies in Asia to respond is increasing, making verbal pushback insufficient. Some form of escalatory response may be inevitable if North Korea is not convinced by China to roll back its new battlefield partnership with Russia. We may witness the inauguration of a Poland–South Korea security partnership, unfathomable several months ago.
In any case, the gap between the two theaters, Asia and Europe, is being bridged, especially as Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea become increasingly interested in a show of U.S. resolve in Ukraine.
The readiness to acknowledge North Korean deployments instead of backtracking on a risky operation may indicate Russia’s unwillingness to seek negotiated solutions, contrary to the Kremlin’s claims of being open to ending the war through negotiations. In the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, Moscow faced a similar dilemma of denying or accepting the evidence presented by Washington of Soviet missile deployments in Cuba.
Once the die was cast and brinkmanship chosen as a response, runaway escalation scenarios were avoided only at the last minute. Moscow may soon realize again the difficulty of reversing escalatory choices that involve smaller allies and considerations of status and prestige.
(This post is republished from The National Interest.)