Observing History As It Happens: Mikhail Troitskiy Joins The Fletcher School as a Visiting Professor

By Rosalinde Nebiolo, MALD 2025 Candidate, The Fletcher School

Mikhail Troitskiy, a former Professor of Practice at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, recently joined The Fletcher School as a Visiting Professor. He is also a Visiting Scholar at the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies at Harvard University.  His research areas include conflicts, security, and politics in Eurasia; Russian foreign policy and U.S.-Russia relations; arms control; and international negotiation. His class on contemporary Russian foreign policy, which he is teaching at Fletcher during the Fall 2024 semester, analyzes Russian decision-making today and its connections to historical events and patterns.

What are you most looking forward to about your class at Fletcher? How does it feel to be teaching about the Russia-Ukraine war, given there will be ongoing developments throughout the class?

I am excited to engage with graduate students who already have clear goals and significant experience. At Fletcher, I anticipate mutually rewarding exchanges with professionals as I consider them.

Teaching about the war offers us numerous benefits as analysts and international relations professionals. We have the opportunity to observe history in the making and to test our assumptions and forecasts as events unfold. The students’ predictions on current events will undergo real-time evaluation. One of the most valuable aspects is our ability to assess who was right or wrong in predicting Russia’s trajectory over its three post-Soviet decades, which essentially led up to the war. We can test all the analytical frameworks that have been applied internationally to Russian foreign policy.

Has the war in Ukraine changed how Russia interacts with the world order? How has that manifested?

Russia has always portrayed its attempt to subjugate Ukraine as an assault on what it calls the “Western-imposed world order.” It is reasonable to assume that the outcome of Russia’s gamble will influence the future of that order. The Russian leadership has never hidden its goal of not just addressing Ukraine’s “Western drift” but also driving a wedge between transatlantic allies. They aimed to prove to the rest of the world that Ukraine’s supposed partners would not come to its rescue, thereby undermining confidence in any security partnerships or guarantees issued by the West.

What can we learn about Russian foreign policy from growing Russian influence in Africa? Is that also reflective of an expansionist foreign policy?  

In the years leading up to the invasion, Russia sought to identify weaknesses in the security architecture of countries and regions significant to NATO or the European Union. Africa is one such place, with potential for outward migration and pockets where radical movements can operate. Russia identified opportunities to exert pressure and cause disturbances for Western countries it considered rivals. They also saw lucrative financial opportunities, such as mining and security contracts for mercenaries. All of this made the continent an attractive prospect for Russia to profit and challenge Europe and the transatlantic community without expending significant resources.

Russia did encounter tensions with Chinese interests, which sometimes came at a cost. However, in some cases, Russia filled the void left by European powers withdrawing from Northern or Sub-Saharan Africa. Fragile regimes in these regions soon came under attack from various extremist movements, including radical Islam and the Islamic State.

In your video introducing your class, you said that some analysts and policymakers failed to accurately predict Russia’s trajectory. Why do you think the West misjudged Russia, and do you think policymakers and experts continue to misunderstand Russian foreign policy?

I believe much of what Russia was preparing for over a long time has now been revealed. I do not think there is a lot of misjudgment now. When it comes to discovering why many analysts were wrong about Russia’s intentions over the years, I am in no position to judge. That said, we can ask why, in a country like the United States, those who raised concerns about Russia’s growing assertiveness and potential for aggression were not in the mainstream. I think that was because diplomacy is the mainstream approach to international politics. If you adhere to the view that diplomacy is essential, you negotiate until the last minute, trying to reach an amicable solution. Alternative approaches remain on the fringes. It is challenging to pivot away from diplomacy to other strategies, and the cost of preparing to support your partners is a difficult decision. Detecting the moment when you can no longer proceed with business as usual and need to adopt a more forceful posture is a difficult task.

Another question is why so many Russians missed the brewing turmoil and preparations for a major war. I think they also believed in diplomacy. For a long time after the mid-1990s, Russia positioned itself as the heir to Soviet diplomacy, portraying its diplomats as skillful and adept at finding creative solutions. Many in government and civil society were convinced that diplomats could peacefully resolve any problem. There were also narratives about Russia’s role in “bringing peace” to Ukraine. Groups that stood to suffer from the turn towards full-scale war were immobilized by their disbelief that such an irrational decision as initiating a major war was possible.

What research projects are you currently working on or looking forward to?

I am working on a project that analyzes how post-Soviet Eurasian leaders, most of whom are authoritarian, respond to setbacks in foreign and domestic policies. There is a common view that they are inflexible and ineffective in addressing the fallout of policy failures. I am highlighting cases where their responses were actually effective and agile, where they were willing to make concessions to dissatisfied groups. I am examining whether a battlefield defeat or a significant domestic policy setback might not be as fatal as much of the current scholarship suggests.

Another project aims to understand why groups in Russia, who stood to lose significantly from the full-scale war in Ukraine, did not act before it was too late. I do not think this is a trivial question. This could potentially apply to other nations in similar positions, bracing for risky maneuvers abroad. Can we identify a pattern that keeps influential groups acquiescent to government policies?