Possibilities and Realities of Russia’s Territorial Disintegration
The Fletcher Russia and Eurasia Program recently hosted a talk on the possibilities and realities of territorial disintegration in Russia, featuring Dr. Irina Busygina as the speaker. Dr. Busygina is Research Scholar at Harvard University’s Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies where she leads the Initiative for Analyzing Post-Soviet Reform Proposals. She is an expert in comparative federalism, regionalization, Russian domestic and foreign policy, and Russia–EU relations. Dr. Busygina has also published two books on federalism theory and the impact of geography on national development.
Resilience of a “Giant Country”
Dr. Busygina underscored that while any country can disintegrate under the right conditions, analysts have likely overstated the chances of Russia’s breakup. Recent history, she explained, demonstrates the Russian regime’s remarkable resilience. A key factor behind this resilience is Russia’s status as a “giant country.” Giant countries—those with a huge landmass and population—are rarely democracies and are almost always at least partially federalized. Russia fits this description and must contend with its vast size as a major variable in its political development.
Territorial Expansion and National Identity
She emphasized the role that sheer size and expansion play in the Russian political consciousness. The idea of Russian uniqueness, Dr. Busygina noted, is closely tied to the expansion of the country’s territory. The annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the current war in Ukraine are telling examples of this mindset, as both actions have been driven primarily by territorial expansion. Even the mechanics of state repression reflect this point: people may criticize aspects of these actions, but not their underlying expansionist rationale. Dr. Busygina highlighted cases where even regime critics supported the annexation of Crimea, viewing it as essential to the Russian national identity.
Backlash to Decentralization in the 1990s
Dr. Busygina also discussed the specter of decentralization, pointing to the 1990s as a period widely perceived in Russia as dangerous and chaotic. During that decade, the federal government’s grip weakened as regions gained more autonomy, leading to turmoil and several separatist movements. Eventually, the Kremlin reasserted control. Notably, Chechnya—once a war-torn breakaway region—became one of the most loyal constituencies of Vladimir Putin’s regime after central authority was restored. Dr. Busygina stressed that this historical experience drives the Kremlin’s current approach: any attempt at political reform or regional empowerment can be stifled by invoking the public’s fear of returning to the anarchic 1990s.
Putin’s Patronage Federalism
She then outlined the workings of the current Russian system of federal control. Rather than granting regions more genuine autonomy, President Putin has built extensive patron–client relationships with regional leaders. This patronage system keeps governors loyal by making them key stakeholders in the regime—providing their regions with generous funding and tightly controlling elections and media to their benefit. Even after the invasion of Ukraine, when regional authorities faced extra pressure from military recruitment drives and increased war production, the system held firm. According to Dr. Busygina, this stability demonstrates that federal disintegration in Russia remains highly unlikely under present conditions.
Scenarios for Disintegration
Finally, Dr. Busygina considered a few hypothetical scenarios in which Russia could break apart. Many outside observers claim that the “Russian imperial system” makes collapse impossible, but she argued that today’s Russia is far more united and complex than a simple empire. Disintegration driven from below by dissidents or as a direct result of imperial overreach is unlikely under the current model. However, she outlined two potential routes by which a breakup might occur:
1. Post-Putin elite fragmentation. In a post-Putin Russia, if the ruling elite in Moscow (the selectorate) expands beyond its current tight circle and fails to agree on a successor, it could lead to intense rivalries and power struggles at the top. Such infighting might destabilize the patronage system and jeopardize the integrity of the state.
2. Rise of a Far Eastern power center. The Russian Far East has received significant industrial investment since the start of the war in Ukraine and is slated to be a national development priority for the coming century. If a major economic power center emerges in the Far East — far from Moscow’s direct oversight and in close proximity to China — it could foster an independent-minded regional leadership. In Dr. Busygina’s view, this regional power base might eventually seek to assert itself politically, potentially initiating a process of disintegration.
Size as a Limiting Factor
As a final thought, Dr. Busygina stressed that Russia’s defining feature is not whether it has a strong or weak state, nor its level of centralization, but rather its sheer size and what she calls its “unlimited” nature. She believes that as long as the country remains this vast, any reforms initiated in Moscow are likely to stall and the system will quickly regenerate itself. In other words, Russia’s enormous scale sharply reduces the chances of successful political modernization.