Russian UGV developments influenced by Ukraine War
The ongoing war in Ukraine is deeply intertwined with the use of different remote-controlled, autonomous, uncrewed and robotic platforms by both sides.
By Samuel Bendett, Fletcher alum and analyst with CNA’s Russia Studies Program
The now-ubiquitous use of uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), target spotting and tracking, artillery correction, bombing missions, combat and logistics is supplemented by the growing uses of uncrewed ground vehicles (UGVs). Emerging evidence of such use on social media platforms and official media outlets point to combat, assault, supply, logistics, and medical evacuation as key roles for a growing number of UGV types. Such utilisation is dictated by the dangerous Ukrainian battlefield where multiple ISR assets such as aerial drones that can provide an almost continuous surveillance and inform a number of firing assets within minutes of target identification, making movements by soldiers and vehicle an increasingly dangerous and fatal endeavour.
This article will cover the rapid emergence of Russian UGVs as a necessary component in the ongoing combat, highlighting key trends through May 2024. As such, this material, taken from public sources including Russian and English language media, should be treated as a reference in the ongoing global analysis of key combat trends dictated by the war in Ukraine. The role of UGVs is still getting shaped by Ukraine combat teeming with numerous countermeasures that include soldiers, electronic warfare systems, UAVs, including small first-person view (FPV) and the conventional (non-FPV) drones capable of ongoing surveillance of the battlefield, as well as rapid strikes at potential targets by artillery, anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), mortars and heavy machine guns (HMGs), along with heavier airborne assets such as combat helicopters and aircraft. In this difficult and dangerous environment, the task of removing soldiers as much as possible from performing dangerous combat missions should be at the top of military agenda for officers and commanders. Despite Russian casualty-intensive approach to fighting Ukrainian defenders since February 2022, there is finally an emerging public debate in the Russian military establishment on ensuring combatant safety in the most dangerous missions.[1] Such debate concentrates on actions taken with UGVs inside the kill zone that spans no more than 10-15 km from the line of contact, where the majority of fighting is taking place.
This article is contingent on several caveats. First, the rapid emergence of commercial components and hardware that now enables much of Ukraine war’s tactical UAV and drone combat also includes using commercial technologies to build different UGV types at the battlefield’s tactical edge. Second, many such developments are now coming from rapidly growing volunteer and civil society efforts – that is, organisations, individuals, startups and small-scale enterprises that are not officially connected to Russia’s vast defence-industrial complex and the Ministry of Defence (MoD). As such, both caveats result in a constantly evolving experimental space where UGV types and models are rapidly tested, evaluated and used if deemed feasible – or discarded in favour of continued experimentation. This does not just concern UGV research, development, testing, evaluation and fielding (RDTE&F) but the larger experimental environment in this war where military, defence sector, volunteers, starts ups and civil society’s efforts sometimes complement, overlap, support or even compete with each other. Therefore, many developments described in this article are indicative of where the war is by mid-2024 and may change rapidly in subsequent months.
Pre-February 2022 Russian UGV developments
In the years prior to its disastrous February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Russian defence industry was working on a number of UGV projects that spanned compact, light, mid-sized and heavy vehicles for demining, logistics and combat operations (see Table 1). Between 2016 and 2021, the Russian military fielded some of these as remote-controlled demonstrators and proofs of concept. All such projects had several things in common. First, all were controlled by an operator in relative proximity, despite the goal for such systems to replace soldiers and vehicles on dangerous missions, thus potentially affecting how such concepts could be fielded in a challenging environment. Second, all were produced and tested in very small numbers, with many being single fielded prototypes, thus limiting the experimentation cycle to a few departments or units tasked with handling a relatively complex and likely costly machine.
| Table 1: Pre-February 2022 UGV prototypes fielded and tested by the Russian MoD[2] | |
| Name | Function |
| Platforma-M | Combat UGV |
| Nerekhta | Combat UGV |
| Soratnik | Combat UGV |
| Kungas | UGV swarm concept |
| Skarabey | Demining UGV (short-range) |
| Sfera | Demining UGV (short-range) |
| Marker | UGV RDT&E prototype |
| Uran-6 | Demining UGV (short-range) |
| Uran-9 | Combat UGV (operator located several km away) |
| Uran-14 | Firefighting UGV |
| Udar | Combat UGV based on the BMP-3 platform |
| Prokhod -1 | Heavy demining UGV |
| Shturm | Heavy UGV for urban combat based on the T-72 tank platform |
Third and perhaps most consequentially, a relatively short RDT&E window prior to the Ukraine invasion did not enable the full development of concepts and tactics for integrating such systems into existing combined arms formations. This concept development was in fact taking place, possibly as part of multiple MOD programs such as ‘The concept of using robotic systems for military purposes’, ‘Creation of advanced military robotics’ comprehensive target programme, and ‘The concept of robotisation of land and sea weapons of the Russian Armed Forces’.[3] Likewise, key Russian experts in ground warfare also publicly acknowledged the difficulty of remote-controlled and potentially AI-enabled UGV inclusion into the continuous interaction among forces and units in combined arms combat.[4]
The few Russian military drills that attempted to do so had very small UGV numbers involved, such as the Zapad-2021 strategic exercises that utilised Uran-9, Nerekhta and Platforma-M with combined arms units.[5] The Uran-9 UGV is a relatively large UGV equipped with a 2A72 30 mm automatic cannon, a PKTM 7.62 mm machine gun (MG), RPO-A Shmel-M thermobaric rockets, and Ataka family ATGMs, which apparently “destroyed enemy units at a distance of 3-5 km while protecting the motorised rifle units” during that exercise. The smaller Nerekhta UGV is armed with a KORD 12.7 mm HMG and AG-30M 30 mm automatic grenade launcher (AGL), and provided reconnaissance and fire support as part of the same scripted drill.[6] Platforma-M used during the same drill can be armed with a PKTM 7.62 mm MG or AG-30M AGL, along with launchers for RPG-26 rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) or Kornet ATGMs.[7]Several Russian UGV uses in actual combat in the years prior to Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine were limited to the much-publicised 2018 use of Uran-9 UGV in Syria, which demonstrated the vehicle’s significant deficiencies in actual battlefield setting.[8] Fourth and overall, despite Russia’s presence in Syria since 2015, there was no significant use of combat or logistics UGVs in that war, despite an additional test of the Soratnik UGV in “near-combat conditions,” or the limited trials of the small Skarabey and Sfera UGVs in urban combat scenarios, and despite Russia’s overwhelming military advantage over anti-Assad forces.[9]
Despite some of the aforementioned limitations, the Russian MoD and its affiliated defence-industrial enterprises were still able to demonstrate the capacity to develop and experiment with remote and optionally controlled and even autonomous technologies for a diverse mission set. For example, the heavy Shturm UGV design was influenced by the need to fight in an urban terrain and was based on a T-72 tank platform, the most numerus pre-February 2022 tank available in the Russian military. The Marker UGV remains the MoD’s flagship project for autonomous movement based on machine vision, with small-scale swarming applications trialled briefly between 2019 and 2021.[10] Still, the aforementioned UGVs were mostly tested in a relatively safe, controlled environment where they faced no threat of actual destruction from adversary assets.[11] That remains the fifth and final reason why practically none of these UGVs are seen in Ukraine today, and those that are fielded are done so in a very controlled environment – such as the Uran-6 demining vehicle used only after its operational area was cleared from any ground or aerial threat.[12]
Just as important, the Russian MoD had no clear and public answer to its tactics and decision if such systems would be lost in combat, nor did it offer too much detail on steps needed to protect such systems in battle, or how to retrieve them (if at all) should they be damaged. While the MoD recognised the fully expendable nature of combat UGVs as replacements and surrogates for humans in combat, there was no clearly-articulated plan to accept and manage such losses when used in combined arms formations.[13] As a harbinger of the threats faced in Ukraine today, some Russian military analysts argued in 2021 that UGVs such as Uran-9 should be used only “in limited capacity, such as low-intensity conflict or reconnaissance missions”, since they would be “annihilated by artillery fire” in battles where a significant number of armoured vehicles are used by both sides, “given such UGV’s limited dexterity and manoeuvrability”.[14] It’s likely that the Russian military and its defence-industrial enterprises tasked with UGV development simply could not envision a battlespace as active and dangerous as the one in Ukraine today. Regardless, the pre-February 2022 Russian UGV developments were characterised by a trend where different system types were tested – tracked, wheeled, built from scratch or based on existing designs – pointing to the Russian military’s drive to conceptualise and understand modern war.
Combat in Ukraine today…
At this point in the Ukraine war, the tactical space – an area up to 10-15 km from the line of contact where the above-mentioned UGVs are most likely to be fielded – is a dangerous and lethal environment for any soldier, vehicle or a military system. The rapid rise of commercial-grade drones such as the DJI Mavic, and the subsequent unprecedented impact of thousands of FPV drones have resulted in the battlespace that is increasingly transparent to the observer, and teeming with numerous remote-controlled ISR assets guiding combat drones ready to pounce on any potential target.[15] The repeated attacks by FPVs, conventional drones and loitering munitions (LMs) have impacted how ground forces operate, forcing the dispersion of human assets, movement during different times of day and night to avoid drones equipped with night vision and thermal imaging equipment, and pushing larger, heavier and more vulnerable systems to operate farther and farther from the line of contact.
Specifically, supply and evacuation missions are now a dangerous effort due to repeated FPV attacks.[16]Both Russian and Ukrainian forces are fielding tactical UAVs that now fly longer and pack more of a punch, with the FPV drones flying up to 15-20km via airborne and ground signal repeaters. The Ukrainian military is fielding heavier multirotor drones dubbed ‘Baba Yaga’ by the Russians, who endure repeated attacks by such UAVs that fly in groups with fixed-wing, conventional quadcopter and FPV drones for greater effectiveness.[17]
The rapid scaling up of different UAV types by the Ukrainian forces have created a ‘steel rain’ that drops bombs and munitions on the Russian positions and military systems, which in turn prompted developments such as metal cages, slat armour, camouflage, nets and numerous counter-UAV (C-UAV) efforts such as electronic warfare (EW) systems deployed at the depth of the tactical space where most of the fighting is done today.[18] Overall, both Russian and Ukrainian militaries are using a large number of cheap, expendable UAVs on a mass scale, and few targets can survive direct attacks from such drones and their accompanying or follow-on tube artillery, multiple-launch rocket systems (MRLSs), and mortars. For their part, Russian assaults on the Ukrainian positions today often involve small groups of soldiers backed by aerial drones and artillery – a casualty-intensive tactic meant to force the Ukrainian defenders to expend their ammunition and to grind down Ukrainian resistance, enabling very small advances during April-May 2024 combat.
…and the emerging UGV technologies and tactics
While the Russian military likely envisioned that intense combat will most certainly result in UGV losses on the battlefield, it’s unlikely that anyone in the Russian MoD could have predicted the type of war waged by tactical drones and their accompanying artillery assets in Ukraine today, and the impact that would have on ground operations. As a result, there is a notable absence of larger, heavier UGVs tested by the Russian MoD before the invasion – at the time this chapter was written, none of the large Uran-9, Shturm or Udar, nor mid-sized Soratnik, Nerekhta, or Kungas variants or prototypes were deployed or tested by the Russian military in the ongoing combat. Apart from the aforementioned Uran-6 demining vehicles, there was a single instance of Platforma-M used somewhere in Russian-occupied Ukraine in May 2023, likely as a test of its capability and probably not in direct combat.[19]
In February-March 2023, Russian state media highlighted the impending test of Marker UGV in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine, with this trial conducted not by official members of the military but by a military-affiliated volunteer organisation.[20] This test was supposed to include a ‘combat’ scenario with anti-tank weapons, along with fielding this UGV as a stationary ISR platform with a tethered drone. Its notable that no actual follow up to such tests were visible anywhere in the official Russian state media or pro-Russian Telegram channels that advertised Marker’s arrival in eastern Ukraine. It’s entirely possible that plans for Marker’s 2023 testing were developed when FPV drones and ISR-tactical drone combos were not quite as ubiquitous and deadly across the front. With a relatively large size, Marker could have been an easy prey for such UAVs, and if any tests were in fact conducted, there were done in relative secrecy and likely in a controlled setting. As of May 2024, there is no further information about Marker anywhere across numerous pro-Russian media spaces that report daily from the war, despite state media claims later in 2023 that future versions of Marker would be modified based on the overall lessons from Ukraine.[21]
The current war in Ukraine is characterised by the move away from fielding expensive standalone platforms such as heavy MALE-class aerial drones, and towards fielding a large number of cheap and attritable systems.[22] This evolution turn from few and expensive towards cheap and plentiful is most visible with a staggering number of conventional drones and FPVs, but is also visible when it comes to the types of UGVs fielded by the Russian military today. These vehicles are relatively small in size and perform mine delivery and ‘kamikaze’ bombing roles, along with supply and logistics runs. Such UGVs include a Yozhik-R (ENG: Hedgehog-R) wheeled UGV supposedly in use in Ukraine, which can carry a 5 kg (11lbs) payload and conduct reconnaissance.[23] Other Yozhik variants in development based on direct feedback from the front supposedly include a version that can carry two TM-62 anti-tank mines weighing 10 kg each, and a vehicle equipped with a miniature six-round multiple rocket launcher with high explosive anti-tank multi-purpose (HEAT-MP) munitions capable of penetrating heavier armour.[24]
Another Russian UGV allegedly used in Ukraine is the SEM-350 multifunctional tracked platform to evacuate wounded soldiers and deliver supplies. This tactical UGV can range between 2–5 km and has a 2 hour battery life. Its modified version, also in development based on frontline feedback, would be able to carry up to 400 kg.[25] According to the Russian state media, another transport and evacuation UGV used in Ukraine in limited numbers is the BRG-1, that can also be equipped with a light machine gun (LMG).[26] So far, all of the aforementioned UGVs are remote controlled, though Russian state media announced potential future artificial intelligence use in the BRG-1 that likely builds on the previous Marker experience with machine vision applications.[27]
Moreover, the Russian state media and pro-Kremlin Telegram channels noted additional UGV designs as ‘kamikaze’ mine deliverers to destroy Ukrainian dugouts and fortifications. Such vehicles included small Lyagushka (ENG: Frog) and Skorpion (ENG: Scorpion) tracked platforms.[28] In fact, given a number of casualties experienced by the Russian military so far, safe evacuation of wounded soldiers has become one of the key priorities for UGV development and fielding, with then-Defence Minister Shoigu remarking that evacuation UGVs are sorely needed at the front.[29] The emphasis on smaller, lighter tracked and wheeled UGVs and evacuation platforms is likewise visible in Russian state media reports on military units that test different uncrewed ground vehicle concepts for combat applications in order to provide feedback to vehicle developers.[30]
A significant aspect of the war in Ukraine is the unprecedented involvement and role of non-military, volunteer and civil society organisations that raise funds to purchase and assemble aerial drones, and build and deliver much-needed equipment and supplies directly to specific units. Such Russian groups and efforts have grown in number and sophistication since mid-2022, and today provide Chinese-made DJI conventional drones, assembled FPVs, counter-UAV and electronic warfare equipment, build masking nets, collect medical kits and food stuffs, and even purchase and deliver vehicles equipped for frontline combat. Interestingly enough, the Russian MoD is not directly interfering with such efforts, since the Russian troops often directly benefit from such volunteer assistance that plugs key capability gaps with frontline forces and units. In fact, Russian President Putin recently acknowledged the work of this ‘People’s VPK’ (Russian acronym for the defence-industrial complex), noting that so many projects are being developed and tested by volunteer and start-up communities that the MoD “does not have time to keep track of them, with new ideas born every day.”[31]
Such volunteer assistance also involved UGV development, testing, assembly and delivery to the frontlines, alongside vehicles and systems delivered by the country’s defence-industrial enterprises. Many such platforms are also assembled by soldiers directly near the line of combat as an immediate solution for ISR, supply runs or medical evacuation efforts. These tracked and wheeled platforms are usually relatively small – just big enough to carry a single wounded soldier out or to deliver around 91 kg (200 lb) worth of supplies or munitions to a given location.[32] Some efforts also install EW jammers on UGVs as a defence against FPV drones and conventional drones during supply and evacuation runs.[33]Other inventive uses for small UGVs involve certain EW systems installed on the vehicle to operate ahead of the soldiers and units to provide an additional counter-UAV layer of protection.[34] Such developments are often advertised on pro-Russian Telegram channels, along with fundraising requests to continue building and delivering such systems.
One specific volunteer-driven project stands out. The Kur’yer (ENG: Courier) light combat UGV development is headed by Boris Rozhin, who goes by Colonelcassad on Telegram – this channel has over 870,000 followers, making him one of the most active and consequential pro-Russian propagandists and volunteers. According to Rozhin, his modular Kur’yer platform can accommodate combat, logistics, supply and electronic warfare equipment, with the basic platform design costing around RUB 1 million, or just around USD 11,000.[35] In contrast, the Platforma-M UGV developed by the MoD costs a reported RUB 6 million (around USD 70,000), with larger and heavier designs mentioned earlier costing even more.[36]
According to Rozhin, even further cost reductions would be possible if this UGV went into mass production. The Kur’yer is apparently easy to assemble and can be produced in large quantities to be easily replaceable in intense Ukrainian combat. Moreover, his UGV was already tested in combat. According to a public narrative posted on Telegram from a soldier who is part of the 74th Guards Separate Motorised Rifle Brigade, several Kur’yers were used this spring in an assault on the Ukrainian trenches. According to the narrative, several Kur’yers got within firing range and begun firing at the Ukrainian positions from their machine guns, apparently surprising the Ukrainian defenders who incurred a number of causalities.[37] This narrative, posted in April 2024, may be related to the 29 March 2024 battle footage of several Kur’yers storming Ukrainian positions and getting identified and destroyed by Ukrainian FPV drones.[38]
The Kur’yer is not the only combat UGV designed by volunteers – over the past year, there were numerous posts on pro-Russian Telegram channels advertising different tracked and wheeled systems. They are all similar insofar as their relatively small size, probable low cost and potential ease of operation make them more suitable at the moment for tactical engagements teeming with aerial and ground-based countermeasures than the more sophisticated, larger UGVs that the MoD was touting before its invasion of Ukraine. The official Russian military community that includes military academics is likewise coming around to the idea of using UGVs in dangerous logistics and resupply missions – vehicles that are likely going to be small and similar to the aforementioned volunteer projects. In a March 2023 article in Voennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought), a public magazine affiliated with the MoD, several authors observing the war in Ukraine noted that given Ukrainian military activity and countermeasures directed against Russian efforts to resupply their frontlines, “the use of traditional crewed armoured vehicles leads to large losses of personnel and vehicles – at the same time, the use of lightly-armoured ground-based transport-type UGVs is becoming increasingly relevant at the frontline.”[39] Moreover, they noted that the use of robotics groups comprising different UAV and UGV classes could “ensure an increase in the speed and volume of supplies to military units at the tactical and operational levels and save the lives of personnel who will be replaced by [such robotic systems] in conducting supply missions”.[40]
The active Russian volunteer effort is still no match or substitute for the sheer power of the country’s defence-industrial sector to mass produce needed solutions. At the same time, there is likely a realisation with the developers of many pre-February 2022 systems mentioned earlier that their creations do not come with adequate protection against the persistent threat of FPV drones and fast follow on strikes. While Russia’s tanks and armoured vehicles can have multiple layers of physical defences such as the so-called ‘cope cages’ and protective screens, such physical protection may be counterproductive when mounted on a UGV. Since most such systems are remote controlled, the operator is required to observe and orient in combat via onscreen imagery and data – a task that was already proven difficult back in 2018 with the Uran-9 Syria tests. At the same time, smaller and simpler UGVs such as the ones described above allow for a continuous attrition given their low cost.
At the same time, projects such as the Shturm heavy UGV, specifically designed for urban combat and supposedly protected against all manner of fires, did not come to fruition before February 2022. The ongoing combat in Ukraine where Russian tanks have to have an increasing amount of physical protection against Ukrainian countermeasures that include aerial drones seems like the exact scenario for which this heavy UGV was designed. Yet the Shturm project did not materialise as intended – possibly due to the lack of a material base, since the Russian military is using every available tank (including those that are many decades old) – against Ukraine.[41] If the Ukrainian tactical battlespace teeming with countermeasures is today’s constant, then a UGV such as Shturm can be highly relevant, assuming it ever gets built and fielded in the required numbers. Until then, smaller and more nimble, remote-controlled UGVs will have to carry the day for the Russian military on the frontlines.
Conclusion
The rapid proliferation of smaller, lighter combat and logistics UGVs across the Ukrainian front at this point in the war points to the immediate combat requirement to provide needed capability and replenish supplies at a cost that is relatively easy to bear for front line units and their respective headquarters. In such cases, simpler and cheaper designs fielded in large numbers are likely more preferable to larger, heavier and more expensive platforms fielded in smaller quantities.
With so many aerial threats such as FPV and conventional drones operating in tactical engagements in Ukraine, any vehicle – including a UGV – can be quickly identified, tracked and ultimately destroyed. Therefore, it’s likely that uncrewed ground vehicle types fielded by the Russian military in the coming months are not going to be large, sophisticated and expensive UGV designs that were tested and evaluated by the Russian military prior to its invasion of Ukraine, or even as recently as early 2023, as with its Marker combat UGV series. As more UGVs will enter combat, both sides will try to develop tactics and concepts for integrating them in assault/battlefield operations. Such tactics may include a degree of autonomy, a goal that the Russian military has been chasing at least since 2016. One of the reasons that we have not witnessed such autonomous UGV operations is the difficulty of developing training models and datasets for a complex battlefield terrain such as in Ukraine right now that is teeming with countermeasures that are both man-made (such as drones and weapons) as well as basic natural obstacles that such UGVs cannot yet overcome without additional and possibly costly assistance. Other potential developments going forward may involve different UGV types working together, or UGV-UAV combos for assault, ISR and other missions.[42]
The emerging tactic dictated by the attritional warfare on Ukraine’s frontlines is to send these combat and supporting UGVs ahead of or instead of soldiers to take humans out of dangerous situations – this is the main point behind developing such systems in the first place.[43] While the Russian MoD has devoted significant resources to UGV RDT&E prior to the February 2022 via several centres specifically devoted to uncrewed development – such as the Main Research and Testing Centre of Robotics for the MoD (GNIITs RT)[44] – the rapid emergence of the volunteer, non-MoD space requires a different mindset to blend together the best military and start-up solutions. To address this, then-Defence Minister Shoigu announced in April 2024 that the MoD will open a research and production centre for drones and robots that will serve as “an association of various enterprises, laboratories and design bureaus involved in the development and production of advanced weapons.”[45] This effort may or may not survive the handover of the highest MoD post from Sergei Shoigu to Andrey Belousov, and its mission is not precisely spelled out, given a plethora of start-ups and volunteers working on the UGV problem set, and the requirements of large defence enterprises already committed to and invested in the development of systems mentioned earlier.
At the same time, there is a reason to suspect that some of the designs born out of the larger non-military space described in this chapter may have significant support going forward. At a May 2024 meeting between President Putin and the commanders of Russian units stationed in Ukraine, one of the officers asked the head of state whether it was possible to organise mass production of ground robotic platforms such as the Kur’yer to equip assault groups – to which the Russian president responded with an affirmative.[46] Moreover, Putin seemed to indicate that the more successful volunteer designs may in fact be launched into mass production – in late May 2024, he remarked that “it is necessary to more effectively use the resources of the so-called people’s defence industry (people’s VPK), to provide an opportunity for further development, expansion and production, and to adopt some of the most effective models into service in an accelerated manner.”[47]
Regardless of statements at the highest Russian government levels, it is becoming clear that many Russian soldiers and military units are not waiting for the official response to their needs and are taking matters into their hands by engaging with volunteer and start-up efforts that deliver combat equipment directly where it’s needed. In the end, the Russian military is also racing against similar efforts by the Ukrainian MoD, which is developing a large lineup of combat, logistics and evacuation UGVs, many of which are starting to go into the field.[48] As the war continues, the ability to field the needed solutions will depend on the Russian MoD’s capacity to identify specific UGV needs and direct resources to produce the required UGV solutions. Until then, the Russian side of the battlefield will include both military-grade and DIY-style efforts that respond to the current requirements of tactical combat.
(This post is republished from European Security and Defence.)