Secrecy and Mediation in the Russo‑Ukrainian War

The Fletcher Russia and Eurasia Program recently hosted Mikhail Troitskiy for a timely conversation on how secrecy shapes peace efforts in the Russo‑Ukrainian war. Drawing on negotiation theory and contemporary cases, Troitskiy asked a simple but consequential question: when does confidentiality help end wars—and when does it start to hurt? His core finding was crisp. Quiet diplomacy is often necessary to open space for compromise, but partial secrecy—when everyone knows talks are happening but no one can see the positions—can create room for backtracking, erode trust in the process, and leave mediators exposed. The art, he argued, is to balance confidentiality with credible, public signals that lock parties into progress.

Troitskiy began by distinguishing two kinds of secrecy that commonly appear in peace processes. Negotiations can be fully covert (the very fact of talks is hidden) or semi‑secret (talks are acknowledged but the substance is withheld). Both models can be helpful at the outset. Secrecy shields negotiators from “two‑level” pressures at home—legislatures, parties, and publics—and reduces the performative grandstanding that tends to dominate public bargaining. It lets leaders “test the waters” with exploratory trade‑offs, deters spoilers who thrive on leaks, and can serve as a costly signal of seriousness when presidents or senior envoys engage directly. Those early, protected interactions can widen the zone of possible agreement and build the trust needed to tackle taboo issues.

But secrecy has a downside. If it persists too long, stakeholders and domestic audiences may feel blindsided by the contours of a deal, and ratification can falter. Semi‑secret processes can be especially treacherous for mediators: unable to reveal sticking points or call out obstruction, they watch as expectations rise and then stall, absorbing the blame for “lack of progress.” Over‑reliance on secrecy can also invite strategic leaking—true or false—that throws negotiations off balance and feeds narratives of incompetence or bias.

Troitskiy applied these insights directly to the ongoing U.S.–Russia–Ukraine diplomacy. Since late 2024, Washington’s attempts to move Moscow and Kyiv toward a settlement have oscillated between private channels and bursts of public optimism. The August 2025 Alaska meeting was emblematic: U.S. leaders hailed “progress” and predicted a Russia–Ukraine summit, while Moscow’s public posture showed little movement and the Kremlin soon rejected a near‑term summit. In parallel, a tentative Russian idea reportedly floated to a U.S. envoy—trading parts of occupied southern Ukraine for unoccupied areas of Donbas—elicited interest from Kyiv and European partners before being retracted. For Troitskiy, this sequence illustrates the pitfalls of semi‑secret bargaining: without visible, reciprocal commitments, parties can advance and retreat with few audience costs, and mediators are left managing disappointment as the goalposts shift.

What, then, should mediators do now in the U.S.–Russia–Ukraine track? Troitskiy’s answer centers on credible signals. To hedge against obstruction, mediators should press for early, public markers of progress—limited but meaningful disclosures that are difficult to walk back. Options include agreeing on a guiding principle (for example, a framework that links sovereignty and security guarantees to territorial arrangements), announcing discrete, reciprocal steps, or instituting a temporary ceasefire that raises the political costs of resuming major offensive operations. By contrast, low‑cost gestures like prisoner exchanges—valuable on humanitarian grounds—may not credibly signal a durable path to peace on their own. The point is to convert private understandings into public commitments that structure expectations, generate momentum, and allocate credit (and responsibility) more fairly.

Troitskiy also highlighted an information strategy suited to this conflict’s complexity. In addition to selective public disclosures, mediators can brief key third‑party stakeholders confidentially—legislators, allies, and community leaders—so that they are not surprised when terms emerge. This “inside track” can prepare domestic audiences for compromise without forcing negotiators to reveal sensitive details prematurely. At the same time, mediators should avoid a posture of indefinite “trust us” messaging; when talks drag on, the credibility costs accumulate for the mediator first, especially if one side is using secrecy to buy time or to demobilize the other side’s supporters.

Looking across 2025, Troitskiy noted that Washington’s more successful crisis‑management efforts shared two traits: they were fast and coordinated, remaining confidential until concrete steps were ready and then going public decisively—often in concert with other mediators. The Ukraine file is harder: Russia is more powerful than other parties Washington has recently nudged toward de‑escalation, and Ukraine is being asked to defend core interests. That is precisely why, Troitskiy argued, a minimal openness requirement should be built into the process now. Kyiv has already outlined elements it could consider under certain guarantees; the next move is to press Moscow to put at least its principles on the record. Even modest, verifiable disclosures from both sides would help lock the negotiation into a realistic lane and give mediators the leverage—and public backing—they need to sustain momentum.

The takeaway from Troitskiy’s talk was pragmatic and forward‑leaning. Begin confidentially to expand the bargaining space; then, at carefully chosen junctures, go public just enough to make progress sticky, raise the costs of reversal, and build legitimacy for any eventual agreement. In Ukraine’s case, that means coupling quiet exploration of tough trade‑offs with timely, credible signals—principles, phased steps, or a ceasefire—that reassure domestic audiences and international partners that negotiations are moving toward an enforceable peace. Used wisely, information becomes a tool of peacemaking; used poorly, secrecy becomes either too much or revealed too late. The challenge for mediators is to calibrate that balance while the window for a workable settlement remains open.