Some thoughts on the Sino-Russian entente

By Daniel W. Drezner, Professor of International Politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University

Early this month, Russia’s Vladimir Putin and China’s Xi Jinping met and then the two countries released a joint statement on international relations entering a new era and global sustainable development. The statement sparked a lot of chatter among foreign policy wonks, including my Washington Post colleague Fareed Zakaria. How big a deal is it?

The phrase that everyone is focusing on is “new inter-State relations between Russia and China are superior to political and military alliances of the Cold War era. Friendship between the two States has no limits, there are no ‘forbidden’ areas of cooperation.” That sounds pretty serious! On the other hand, the very next part of the statement claims that “strengthening of bilateral strategic cooperation is neither aimed against third countries nor affected by the changing international environment and circumstantial changes in third countries.” That is such a laughably absurd claim that it calls into question the truth value of the other 5,000 odd words in the document.

If one takes the document seriously and not literally, however, there are realpolitik and idealpolitik implications. The former are more important right now, while the latter might be more important in the future.

Right now, what matters is that neither great power perceives the other one as an immediate threat. Border disputes between the two countries were resolved back in 2008. This frees up considerable military assets by both sides to concentrate elsewhere. As the New York Times’s Edward Wong notes, “Moscow felt confident enough to move troops from its east to near Ukraine to prepare for a potential invasion — drawing down Russian troops on the borders with China and Mongolia to their lowest level since 1922.”

There are limits to the realpolitik benefits. The statement did not mention Ukraine. At the Munich Security Conference, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated explicitly that “Ukraine is no exception” to the principle of respecting territorial sovereignty. China does not want to see what an actual war in Europe would do to the global economy. But Xi appears to be copacetic with enabling Putin to attempt some coercive diplomacy. Now that war is happening, China will probably reprise its 2014 behavior, which allowed Putin to change facts on the ground.

The speculation that China will move on Taiwan at the same time that Russia moves on Ukraine seems much more fanciful. Part of the reason Russia is moving on Ukraine is that its strategic position has worsened since 2014, as Ukraine has reoriented itself more and more toward the West. China, on the other hand, can envision a future in which it is stronger and not weaker. Xi can afford to wait until its military buildup is more formidable, and has little reason to rush his timetable.

The idealpolitik implications have the potential to be longer-lasting. The joint statement provides a rather peculiar definition of democracy:

There is no one-size-fits-all template to guide countries in establishing democracy. A nation can choose such forms and methods of implementing democracy that would best suit its particular state, based on its social and political system, its historical background, traditions and unique cultural characteristics. It is only up to the people of the country to decide whether their State is a democratic one.

The sides note that Russia and China as world powers with rich cultural and historical heritage have long-standing traditions of democracy, which rely on thousand-years of experience of development, broad popular support and consideration of the needs and interests of citizens.

Those sentences take quite the journey, by which I mean that it starts with a plausible point but ends in a place that requires a powerful willingness to suspend disbelief. Suffice it to say that I don’t think either Russia or China has any long-standing traditions of democracy.

What is interesting is not the plausibility of the argument, but rather the effort to make it. Russia and China are attempting to reinterpret norms of democracy as a means of advancing their material interest. It will not work now but think of rhetorical adaptation strategies like this one as a more long-term form of power politics.

The hard-working staff here at Spoiler Alerts has been warning for years that the Sino-Russian entente is on stronger footing than many inside the Beltway had speculated. It is good to see that this statement has triggered a reassessment of the strategic situation. There are some serious implications that emerge from this rhetoric. Everyone inside the Beltway will focus on the realpolitik; I hope at least a few strategic planners start thinking about the idealpolitik as well.

This piece was re-published from The Washington Post.