The Dangerous Game of Nuclear Ambiguity
By Dylan Land, MALD 2022 Candidate, The Fletcher School
President Vladimir Putin’s order to place Russian “deterrence forces” on a “special regime of combat duty” created a torrent of speculation about the possibility of World War III and nuclear Armageddon. It remains unclear, however, what Putin is trying to communicate with this declaration, what his expected outcome is, and how the order might change calculations in Western capitals about their support for Ukraine. It is never a promising sign when the commander of the world’s largest nuclear arsenal relies on saber-rattling to achieve his political goals.
The ambiguous order raises the risks of miscalculation and inadvertent escalation that could lead to the use of nuclear weapons, and while it is important for the West to be cautious in its approach to supporting Ukraine, the knee-jerk reaction to fear the onset of WWIII may play right into Putin’s strategy.
Some Russia analysts contend that Moscow’s military doctrine is premised on a strategy of deterrence through “fear-inducement,” or “intimidation” (устрашение).[1] Others, including contributors to the 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, identify Russia’s strategy as one of “escalate to de-escalate.” Within the context of the current war in Ukraine, Putin’s order increases the risks of miscalculation or inadvertent escalation that could lead to the use of nuclear weapons. The increased risk—and the spectacle of Putin’s risk tolerance—is meant to sober adversaries and temper their subsequent behavior, thus deescalating the conflict.
Whether this is interpreted as intimidation, or as an escalation, the order can be seen as an attempt to dissuade the West from continuing to support Ukraine and accelerate the termination of the conflict on terms favorable to Russia.
When mandating his “deterrence forces” be put on a “special regime of combat duty,” Putin cited “illegitimate sanctions” and “aggressive statements” as motivations for the change. It is unclear what behavior Putin is trying to deter, and what is more ambiguous is the threat itself. Former Russian military officers have indicated that the “special regime of combat duty” does not fit within any of the four alert statuses in Russian nuclear doctrine.[2] The Pentagon has also indicated that there have been no observable changes in Russian nuclear force posture.[3]
The obscurity of the order may, however, be precisely the point. Instead of trying to deter a specific action, Putin may be trying to raise the overall risk of Western involvement in Ukraine—which aligns with the strategy of deterrence through fear-inducement or “escalate to de-escalate”. Ambiguity could also protect Putin’s credibility. If he tailored a specific threat to a specific action or behavior, Putin would have to follow through with the threat if the action was taken to maintain the credibility of Russia’s deterrent—an outcome that is unlikely to serve anyone’s interest.
Putin may find, however, that opaque nuclear saber-rattling, while implying an increased risk of nuclear use, may not effectively deter undesired behavior. If the order was meant to coerce the West into stopping military shipments to Ukraine or prevent the further imposition of sanctions, the objective has failed. Western support for Ukraine remains steadfast, sanctions continue to cripple the Russian economy, and countries from around the world are supplying Ukraine with military equipment to fight against the invading Russian army.
What is clearer than Putin’s order is his commitment to Russia’s military campaign in Ukraine, and his willingness to raise nuclear risks if the balance of power on the ground does not turn in his favor. If Putin attempts to further intimidate the West out of supporting Ukraine by escalating the risks of nuclear use, there will be good reason to tread lightly and avoid accidents, miscalculations, and inadvertent escalation. Whether his subsequent threats can effectively deter what Putin perceives as undesired behavior will depend on how well he communicates his threats—how distinguishable his tripwires are in the fog of war.
It is worth noting, however, that Putin’s order raised considerable alarm across social media and news outlets throughout the West. The immediate onset of anxiety may be precisely part of Putin’s plan to increase the risks of nuclear use and coerce the West to moderate its support for Ukraine, thus enhancing Russia’s military advantage in the war.
Much remains to be seen about the next phases of the crisis in Ukraine and no one—not even Putin—can anticipate how Russia’s war plans will play out. If the balance of power on the ground in Ukraine does not quickly shift in Russia’s favor, Putin may be incentivized to further increase the risks of nuclear use. Whether or not this will effectively deter the West from its involvement in Ukraine cannot be known.
Increased risks of miscalculation and inadvertent escalation should trouble everybody. The West should be cautious not to back Putin into a corner where he is incentivized to rely on nuclear brinksmanship to achieve his political goals. However, hyperbolizing the possibility of catastrophic nuclear war could stymie the West’s support of Ukraine and result in an outcome much more favorable to Russia.
[1] https://warontherocks.com/2020/06/escalation-management-and-nuclear-employment-in-russian-military-strategy/
[2] https://www.dw.com/en/putin-puts-nuclear-deterrence-forces-on-alert/a-60936141
[3] https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2022/03/01/no-changes-coming-to-us-nuclear-posture-after-russian-threat/