The Russia-Ukraine War and Azerbaijan’s Invasion of Armenia, A Conversation with Eric Hacopian

By Alex Avaneszadeh, MALD 2023 Candidate, The Fletcher School

On October 25, 2022, Fletcher Armenia Club leader Alex Avaneszadeh interviewed Eric Hacopian, the host of Civilnet TV’s political briefing show “Insights”, based in Yerevan, Armenia. Hacopian discussed the impact of the Russia-Ukraine War on the South Caucasus, and in particular, Armenia-Azerbaijan relations and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 

The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh is often framed as a territorial dispute. However, many Armenians consider this to be inaccurate, and that at its core, the Karabakh conflict is about the self-determination of Karabakh Armenians. As an autonomous region under the Soviet Union, Karabakh Armenians experienced socio-political marginalization and persecution under Soviet- and post-Soviet Azerbaijan. In response, they declared themselves independent in 1991 during the first Nagorno-Karabakh War. The self-proclaimed Republic of Artsakh, backed politically, economically, and militarily by Armenia, is internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan.

The second Nagorno-Karabakh War, which lasted from September to November 2020, ended with a Russian-mediated ceasefire agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Roughly 2,000 Russian peacekeepers were subsequently deployed to Karabakh proper after Azerbaijan took over many of the surrounding districts. 

In his opening remarks, Hacopian stated that “the crux of the problem of the Armenia-Azerbaijan relationship is Nagorno-Karabakh, referred to as Artsakh in Armenian.” 

Earlier in 2022, Azerbaijan launched a full-scale military offensive against Armenia on September 12, having heavily shelled its eastern border, including the provinces of Vayots Dzor, Gegharkunik, and Syunik. After the UN Security Council discussed the issue, a ceasefire agreement was established between Armenia and Azerbaijan on September 14, albeit with Azerbaijan continuing to occupy parts of Armenia’s sovereign territory. The two-day offensive resulted in the death of roughly 135 Armenian soldiers. This offensive reflected the power vacuum growing in the South Caucasus while Russia is distracted with its war in Ukraine.

“The recent aggression, which is the second or third time that Azerbaijan has attacked Armenia proper, is to force an agreement on their terms–essentially compellence diplomacy. Their side is militarily more powerful than the Armenian side,” Hacopian said.

“The gist of the political problem today is really that the regime in Baku wants a totalist solution. Their ideal solution is the area being ethnically cleansed of its Armenian population and to get that area back without any of their residents,” he added. 

“Azerbaijan used the Ukraine war as an opportunity for aggression,” but trying to figure out the impact of the war on the politics of the South Caucasus “is like seven-dimensional chess,” Hacopian said. 

Despite Azerbaijan’s frustration with the presence of Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh, Hacopian noted that “there is almost a three-way alliance between Turkey, Azerbaijan and Russia. We have seen massive amounts of oil smuggling that happens through Azerbaijan. This is a country whose oil production has been declining every single year, and has been for the past ten years, and suddenly their exports go up by fifty percent. So obviously they are laundering Russian oil. By the way, so is half the world.” 

Nevertheless, “a Moscow that is distracted or seen as weak actually emboldens [Azerbaijan],” he continued. That poses dangerous implications for the region, particularly for Armenia and the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Azerbaijan has also reaped the political benefits of being a natural gas supplier, despite being acknowledged as one of the most authoritarian regimes in the world. In July 2022, President of the European Commission Ursula Von Der Leyen visited Baku to conclude a deal with Azerbaijan to double Azeri gas exports to Europe by 2027, in an apparent effort to secure alternatives to Russian gas.

Hacopian called this deal into question, saying, “Azerbaijan is a very small producer of gas. They provide one percent of European energy needs. Their maximum potential in five years is to get to two percent. To put it into perspective, the Russian gap that they are trying to fill is forty percent. So this was more really campaigning to European voters that the EU is doing something, which has disastrous consequences because it enables a genocidal regime. As far as energy goes, the deal is a complete fraud. It is a political project, not an economic one, not an energy one.” Russia’s Gazprom began supplying gas to SOCAR, Azerbaijan’s state gas company, after the invasion of Ukraine, raising the question of whether Azerbaijan is simply re-packaging and exporting Russian gas to Europe. 

Since the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine war, the West and Russia have been in a tug-of-war for the role of mediator in the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace negotiations. However, Hacopian noted that the E.U. and U.S. also have different goals in the South Caucasus.

He said, “The EU’s interest is to push Russia out of the South Caucasus,” but that “the U.S. role is far more relevant and politically notable than the EU,” as it had a hand in ending Azerbaijan’s military offensive against Armenia. 

Regarding the Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh, Hacopian stated, “Everyone knows that if the Russian peacekeepers leave Karabakh, you will have the second Srebrenica on the European continent in thirty years. Because if you listen to the language coming from Baku, it is borderline genocidal…[The September 2022 attack] saw Armenian prisoners of war executed on video and put out by agents of the Azeri regime.”

However, this does not take away from the fact that Russian interests in Karabakh are for Russia and their presence is not humanitarian, Hacopian explained.

“Russia does not care if there are 100,000 Armenians in Karabakh or 65,000. What this does is that it allows them to have a stranglehold on multiple countries, and their interest is for this issue not to be resolved so that they do not have to leave,” he said. 

Armenia and the Armenians of Karabakh therefore face a difficult dilemma. If Russia is weakened in the war with Ukraine and Azerbaijan continues its military aggression with impunity, Armenians face an increased threat of genocide. Yet if Russia comes out of the Ukraine war victorious, Armenia and Karabakh’s security concerns regarding its Turkic neighbors may force Armenia to remain a political hostage of Russia. 

Hacopian also shed light on Azerbaijan’s actions, saying, “One of the reasons that Aliyev is so aggressive is because time is not necessarily on his side anymore. It used to be. By the end of this decade, Azerbaijan is really out of the oil business. In the national gas business, they are marginal players. He needs to get things done right now because the balance of forces is not likely to stay the same in five or ten years.” 

Since this interview took place, Nagorno-Karabakh has been blockaded by Azerbaijan via the Lachin corridor, the only road connecting Karabakh Armenians to the outside world. As a result, there have been severe shortages of food, medical supplies, and goods since early December 2022, while internet connectivity, electricity, and gas supply have been tampered with. That said, Russian peacekeepers have been unsuccessful in re-opening the Lachin corridor. As of this moment, the Armenian population of Karabakh, numbering roughly 120,000, is on the brink of famine. Azerbaijan continues to deny that any blockade is taking place.