There Should Not Be a Ceasefire Deal with Russia

By Pavel Luzin, Visiting Scholar at the Fletcher Russia and Eurasia Program

Executive Summary:

• Russia remains committed to its long-term strategic goals as it continues its war in Ukraine, including undermining US global influence, fracturing Trans-Atlantic unity, and aligning with authoritarian regimes, such as Iran and North Korea.
• Russia’s reliance on outdated stockpiles and unconventional resupply shows vulnerability, but its determination to sustain the war in Ukraine demands continued Western aid to Ukraine and strikes on Russian military infrastructure.
• If Moscow accepted a ceasefire, it would provide Russia with an opportunity to regroup, rebuild its military-industrial base, and reignite its aggression, posing a renewed threat to global security.

On November 13, the Russian government suddenly decreased payments for soldiers injured in combat. Only a portion of wounded soldiers can expect the “standard” three million rubles (around $30,000) of compensation. Depending on the injury class, others will only receive either one million rubles (around $10,000) or 100,000 rubles (around $1,000). This does not mean that the Russian state is running out of money. Rather, it indicates that intentional wounds are widespread in the Russian army to make money and escape from the battlefield at the cost of personal health (Publication.pravo.gov.ru, November 13). This demonstrates that many Russian soldiers do not want to fight in Ukraine and are willing to cause personal injury to get out of combat, illustrating that they do not truly believe in the fight for their motherland. Additionally, the State Duma has passed a law enhancing the financial liability of members of volunteer formations for damages and loss of military equipment. This law indicates troubles with combat motivation and discipline (Kommersant, November 13; Sozd.duma.gov.ru, accessed November 14). Despite the disillusionment of the Russian people and many in the Russian military with this war, Russia is still committed to its strategic foreign and military purposes set forth for 2024.

Besides eliminating Ukraine’s statehood and culture, these purposes include undermining the United States’ global role and eliminating Trans-Atlantic unity. To accomplish these goals, Russia is developing an axis of totalitarian and authoritarian regimes. Most worryingly, it receives weapons from Iran and North Korea. In return, Russia aids North Korea and Iran in the development and deployment of satellites (see EDM, November 4). This assistance inevitably contributes to their missile and nuclear programs (South China Morning Post, July 9). The ability to operate a satellite in low Earth orbit allows for a warhead to be launched by an intermediate-range or intercontinental ballistic missile through an exoatmospheric trajectory. Russia’s partnership with these countries gives both Russia and the other powers the ability to continue developing their authoritarian regimes. Moreover, Russia’s “holy war” against the United States and the West became a significant tool for domestic consolidation of the authoritarian regime with dysfunctional institutions of power (see EDM, January 30, 2023, August 5).

The Russian army is in a precarious position in Ukraine. While it is still capable of capturing pieces of devastated Ukrainian territory, as long as Ukraine continues to receive weapons and other aid from allies, Moscow is unable to defeat Kyiv’s army and to make it surrender. Paradoxically, even as Russia’s ability to continue to advance arms manufacturing and sufficiently train its military worsens, the state of Russia’s abilities remains a long-term, dangerous, and unpredictable threat until defeat. Risks arise if Russia is granted a ceasefire, as it will allow for restoration and room for maneuver in other theaters where it can become a much more urgent threat to the West.

Historical Lessons: No Compromises With a “Wounded Bear”

Despite its quantitative superiority, Russia can be defeated in Ukraine. Historically, superior powers were defeated by weaker opponents. Coalitions based on shared values and economic interests have consistently been stronger than superior powers or any axes of dictatorships. For example, the British Empire was defeated in 1783 after the American Revolutionary War. The German Empire was defeated in World War I in 1918, even though it controlled huge territories from Ukraine in the East to parts of Belgium and France in the West. There were just no compromises or breaks for the aggressors.

The same should hold true today. There cannot be a compromise. Russia needs the whole of Ukraine under its political, military, and economic control, and it needs a springboard for further actions against the United States and its European allies due to Russia betting everything on this war. It is not just a matter of historical chimeras, but a matter of political, economic, and even physical survival of the Russian political elite.

In turn, Ukraine is struggling not just for the liberation of territories, but also for the survival and  elimination of the Russian threat. Perhaps the liberation of territories will be a sequence in Russia’s defeat. Ukraine can continue to constrain and slowly destroy Russian ground forces only if the United States, Europe, and other partners continue to grant assistance to the war effort.

Weakening of Russia’s Military Must be Continued

Three years ago, the idea that Russia would buy loitering munitions and ballistic missiles from Iran and artillery shells, ballistic missiles, soldiers, and even self-propelled howitzers from North Korea was unimaginable (Militarnyi, January 9; Kyiv Post, November 15). It is becoming clearer every day that Russia is willing to make deals with whatever power it can as it becomes increasingly isolated internationally. Russia is additionally using other unconventional and unexpected tactics for supplying its military. The state-owned cinema production company Mosfilm delivered a battalion of T-55 tanks and other equipment from its stage property to the Russian army (Kremlin.ru, November 13; Istories.media, November 14). Russia continues to rely on its Soviet-era arm stockpiles, but it is not endless and is unlikely to retain their significance after 2025 (see EDM, March 14).

International aid, together with necessary strikes against Russian military-industrial facilities, will hinder Russia’s ability to restore its conventional military power, dramatically limiting it in the long term (see EDM, October 24). While simplifying arms manufacturing could allow Russia to restore part of its military power, this is not a sustainable method. For example, it could produce armored commercial trucks made domestically using China-made components or arms imported from China, but Russia is limited in which countries it can import materials or weapons (Russian-chinese.com, May 14; Izvestiya, October 14). As Russia continues down this path, it could remain a threat to its neighbors for the short term, but it will not be a vital threat as its military-industrial complex continues to deteriorate.

Despite its military deterioration, Russian leadership still demonstrates a will to fight. It is harder to say the same about Russian society. Forty percent of Russians still approve of signing military contracts, against 42 percent who do not, and 17 percent who found it difficult to answer. Russian support for the war is still very high in Russian society (Levada.ru, November 6). However, as the Kremlin continues to take away incentives to fight and support its war, as they have just done for wounded soldiers, the will to continue the war will continue to slowly but irreversibly decline. This process needs time to occur, but the West should do everything it can to facilitate the degradation of the Russian army, military-industrial complex, and support for the war. If the West allows for a break at the current stage of the war, the Kremlin will gain room for maneuvering, recuperation, and the opportunity to convert the Russian people’s frustration with the war into the next round of support and aggression.

(This post is republished from The Jamestown Foundation.)