Three Flashpoints for Türkiye in the Wake of the Israel-Iran Escalation

By Mustafa Gül, Fletcher Alum

In October 2023, at the onset of the Gaza War, I wrote about the potential challenges Türkiye would face from the likely escalation of the Israel-Iran rivalry in the Middle East as a result of the war. It appears today that that button might have been pushed.

To everyone’s surprise, the Assad regime in Syria suddenly collapsed. Thus, the points I made in the article regarding Iranian-Turkish competition in Syria are, largely, no longer relevant. However, the Kürecik radar station and Türkiye’s security commitments in Azerbaijan — two flashpoints I had mentioned — still stand out in terms of the strategic significance of this event for Türkiye.

Here are the three key issues that I believe Ankara will be cautiously watching during this new phase of the conflict:

1. Kürecik Radar Station

Iranian officials have openly stated in the past that they would target the Kürecik Radar Station — NATO’s early-warning system in southeastern Türkiye — in the event of a U.S. or Israeli strike on Iran. However, I think the geopolitical beating Iran has suffered in the post-October 7 Middle East has largely revealed that Tehran’s threats are not very credible. Therefore, I don’t believe this is an immediate threat for Ankara at the moment, as Iran would much rather deal with Israel without getting the U.S. or NATO involved. That said, it is impossible to know what a prolonged war might lead to, and it is still uncertain whether that is going to be the situation between Israel and Iran.

2. Israel-Azerbaijan Ties

Israel and Azerbaijan are on very good terms, reinforced by strong defense and energy ties. Baku supplies large volumes of oil to Tel Aviv through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline via Türkiye — where British Petroleum (BP) is the largest shareholder and main operator. In the first five months after October 7, Azerbaijan supplied 1.4 million metric tons of oil to Israel through the BTC pipeline, single-handedly covering 25–30% of Israel’s total oil demand.

On the other hand, Israel has provided Azerbaijan with military hardware that played a key role in Azerbaijan’s recapture of Karabakh. These supplies include — but are not limited to — modern assault rifles (IWI Tavor), air defense upgrades (Barak 8, SPYDER), and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance platforms (Elbit Hermes 450, IAI Heron), in addition to more widely known supplies such as combat drones (Harop suicide drones).

It is not a secret that one of the main drivers of Israeli-Azerbaijani cooperation is a shared desire to contain Iran. This cooperation has reached a point where Azerbaijan has reportedly played a key role in Israel’s covert operations in Iran in recent years. There have also been rumors that Azerbaijan’s Sitalchay Military Airbase has been utilized to host Israeli air force assets for potential strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities.

Iran also hosts 12 to 20 million ethnic Azeris, primarily in the north — another potential tipping point between Iran, Türkiye, and Azerbaijan. A pan-Turkic mobilization among this population driven by potential internal instability is a serious concern for Tehran.

All of these factors put Azerbaijan in the spotlight for Iran with regard to its perceived Israeli threat. However, the Azerbaijani leadership also sees Iran as a permanent and significant actor in its neighborhood and appears to want to maintain a normal relationship with Tehran. Accordingly, I believe Baku will want to steer clear of this conflict. That said, as in the first case, it is impossible to know what a prolonged war might lead to, and it is still uncertain whether that will be the case between Israel and Iran.

If, however, Azerbaijan comes under Iranian attack, Türkiye might find itself compelled to come to its defense — not only because of the exceptional cultural-political ties between the two countries, but also due to treaty obligations under the Shusha Declaration, signed in 2021. This bilateral collective defense agreement guarantees that if one signatory comes under attack, the other will come to its aid. Notably, it is Türkiye’s first collective security agreement outside NATO’s Washington Treaty, and the first formal document to describe the Türkiye-Azerbaijan partnership as an “alliance.”

3. Energy

Türkiye has already been grappling with a rampant cost-of-living crisis for years, driven by inflation and now increased financing costs. Since the last presidential elections, the new economic management team has adopted and implemented a program promising to bring down inflation and restore growth through a return to orthodoxy. After almost two years, the success of this program is widely questioned — especially by the public — and a clear way out remains elusive. Amid these criticisms, the economic management has often cited declining oil and commodity prices as a positive factor in reducing inflation. Unfortunately, in today’s world, such advantages rarely last long.

Around 20–30% of the world’s oil and gas supplies pass through the Strait of Hormuz — Iran’s backdoor. Disruption in this corridor would pose a significant problem for Türkiye’s economy. As a country lacking traditional energy resources and heavily dependent on imports, hydrocarbons remain by far Türkiye’s most costly import — totaling roughly $66 billion in 2024. For comparison, Türkiye’s trade deficit in 2024 was $82 billion, meaning energy imports accounted for approximately 83% of the deficit.

Moreover, Iran is one of Türkiye’s top natural gas suppliers. Until 2021, it was the second-largest exporter of natural gas to Türkiye, covering 17% of imports. While Türkiye has tried to diversify away from Russia and Iran in recent years, progress has been limited. In 2023, Türkiye imported 5.4 bcm of gas from Iran, accounting for 10.7% of total imports. In 2024, this figure rose by over 30%, to 7 bcm — covering 13.5% of Türkiye’s total natural gas imports. It is also important to note that these supplies are secured through long-term contracts and delivered via underground pipelines, meaning less flexibility for Türkiye to divert from Iran.

I find it interesting how uncommon it is for people to think about Iran when they think about the “eastern flank” of NATO. The Türkiye-Iran border, in fact, is quite literally NATO’s easternmost frontier. Like in the Russia-Ukraine War, I think it will be tough for Ankara to position itself in a conflict where its modern allies and ancient neighbors are on opposing sides.

(This post was republished from Medium.)