Transitional Justice Options for Postwar Russia

The Fletcher Russia and Eurasia Program recently hosted a talk featuring Dr. Thomas F. Remington, Visiting Professor of Government at Harvard University and Goodrich C. White Professor (Emeritus) of Political Science at Emory University. His lecture focused on transitional justice options for postwar Russia, building upon a recent article in Post-Soviet Affairs entitled “Transitional justice options for post-war Russia.”

Professor Remington is an expert in Russian politics and has authored numerous books on the subject. His research concerns the political sources of economic inequality in the United States, Russia, China, and Germany, as well as the role of competition law in the reconstruction of Europe after World War II.

Background

Dr. Remington began by examining past transitional justice efforts, focusing on Germany’s experiences after the two World Wars. In the aftermath of the First World War, Germany faced what was described as a “victors’ justice,” with onerous reparations imposed to cover the victors’ costs of the conflict. While this approach sought retribution, it failed to address the root causes of the war. Dr. Remington warned that a similarly punitive peace with Russia could sow the seeds for future conflict if a settlement is seen as unfair—potentially motivating a later leader to resume hostilities.

He then contrasted this with the aftermath of the Second World War, when the Allies tried many Nazi war criminals at Nuremberg. However, many Germans still considered themselves victims of the war and the occupation. It took three generations for Germans to begin to come to terms with the crimes of the Nazi regime.  Moreover, a Nuremberg-style tribunal is unlikely in Russia’s case, since the war is not being fought on Russian territory and the Russian leadership is not directly threatened by an occupying force.

Possible Venues for Holding Russia Accountable

Dr. Remington identified several potential venues through which Russia could be held accountable for war crimes and damages stemming from the war in Ukraine. These include:

• Universal jurisdiction in European courts: Several European countries allow their national courts to prosecute war crimes under universal jurisdiction, even if the crimes occurred elsewhere and the accused are tried in absentia. Evidence gathered by Ukrainian and international investigators could be used to indict Russian officials for atrocities, even if those individuals never face physical arrest.
• Seizure of Russian state or oligarch assets: Freezing and confiscating Russian assets held abroad to fund Ukraine’s reconstruction. This approach has been discussed as a form of reparations, but it faces legal and political hurdles. For instance, some countries (such as Belgium, where many assets are held) oppose bearing the costs and risks of implementing such a plan.

Historical Models for Transitional Justice

Dr. Remington placed Russia’s situation in the context of previous conflicts, surveying how different societies have pursued post-conflict justice. Historical examples discussed included:

• Post-World War II Germany (Nuremberg Trials): After WWII, the Allied powers established tribunals in Nuremberg to prosecute Nazi war criminals. This process was enabled by the total defeat and occupation of Germany and provided a clear reckoning for atrocities, albeit under the auspices of the victorious powers.
• Ancient Athens’ “Amnesty” (403 BC): In ancient Athens, following a period of civil strife, the victors implemented a novel policy under which Athenians agreed to “forget” past crimes and to emphasize reconciliation as a way to restore stability and civic unity.
• Lustration in post-communist Eastern Europe: After the fall of communist regimes in Eastern Europe, many new governments undertook lustration — exposing and barring from power those officials complicit in past abuses — to distance themselves from the old regime. This practice of truth-telling and accountability was not implemented in Russia’s own post-Soviet transition, but Dr. Remington suggested it could become politically viable in a post-Putin Russia if future elites seek to reintegrate with Europe by demonstrating a break from the past.

Possible Futures

Finally, Dr. Remington examined how transitional justice might unfold in a postwar Russia. He recognizes that a thorough, long-term process of reform — including truth-seeking commissions and war crimes tribunals—is unlikely to happen in the immediate future. However, as Russian elites face continued sanctions pressure and a weakened geopolitical position, they may pursue more limited accountability measures in exchange for concessions from the West. In particular, future developments could include:

• Scapegoating of leadership: Russian power brokers might lay all the blame for the war on President Vladimir Putin, positioning him as the sole culprit. This scenario could involve charging Putin with crimes or forcing him out of power, thereby offering up a high-profile figure to satisfy calls for justice while preserving the rest of the regime.
• Controlled transparency and reset: The Russian government could implement a limited “openness” campaign—for example, acknowledging certain truths about the war or allowing partial accountability for lower-level offenders—as a way to signal change. Such a move would likely be coupled with efforts to reset relations with Ukraine and Western countries, aiming to relieve sanctions and international isolation.

Dr. Remington noted that meaningful transitional justice in Russia is still a long way off, especially without a change in leadership at the very top.