Volodymyr Dubovyk: “The bear may be bleeding, but it is very much alive”

Ukrainian Political Scientist and International Relations expert Volodymyr Dubovyk about the grain deal’s future, his country’s EU and NATO ambitions, and the Russian invasion’s knock-on effects on the Black Sea region

By Volodymyr Dubovyk, Visiting Scholar and Professor at The Fletcher School

Klaus Stimeder, Odessa

Volodymyr Dubovyk is Visiting Professor at Tufts University and Director of the Center for International Studies at Odesa Mechnikov National University. Shortly after the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Dubovyk left Ukraine and now teaches at Tufts as a benefactor of the “Scholars at Risk” initiative, an international umbrella program supporting academics from war-torn countries. The two-time Fulbright scholar has researched at the Kennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (1997, 2006-2007), and the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland (2002). He has published numerous articles on U.S.-Ukraine relations, Black Sea regional security, international security, and Ukraine’s foreign policy and security.

STANDARD: Mr. Dubovyk, another stop-gap solution of the so-called grain deal allowing Ukraine to export some of its agricultural products, is emerging in Istanbul, negotiated between Ukraine, Russia, Turkey, and the UN. What are the chances the deal will hold up in the short and the long term?

Dubovyk: I think the grain deal will go forward in the short term, also because the Turks are so invested in it. Still, you cannot predict anything with certainty. As proven time and again in the course of this war, the Russians often do things out of their pure viciousness. Sometimes they want to hurt Ukraine just for the sake of causing hurt. Our economy has been badly wounded already, and the Russians at one point may say, ‘Okay, let’s finish them off by targeting agricultural exports”.

STANDARD: Does Erdogan’s re-election have consequences for the grain deal?

Dubovyk: I do not think so, and I also do not believe that Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu would have changed anything if he had been elected. Most Turks agree the deal represents an achievement for Turkish diplomacy, as it boosts their status in the region. I went to Turkey with a student group only some weeks ago, and talking to politicians and academics there, my experience was that people take it as a manifestation of Turkey being able to do something in the region, to offer actual mediation and facilitate compromise. Hence, I think a change of government will not change that attitude.

STANDARD: What is Russia’s incentive for staying in the deal?

Dubovyk: I think the Kremlin uses the deal to maintain at least some channel of negotiation in which Western players are involved. The truth is also that, unlike in the early months of the war, enforcing a total blockade of shipments would be extremely difficult. Their battleships cannot come close to Ukraine’s shores anymore because now we have a sufficient amount of anti-ship missiles, and hijacking ships loaded with grain in international waters would be universally condemned. While the Russians still can pull some levers to sabotage the deal, all that is left for them to do right now is to slow down the inspection process.

STANDARD: If one listens to some Ukrainian government representatives these days, one is led to believe EU and NATO accession is just around the corner. But is this rhetoric not dangerous in the long run, as many people will be disappointed if it will not happen, at least not in the short term?

Dubovyk: It is a bit of a dilemma. If you are in government, you need to tell people there is a perspective we might one day join the EU and NATO. At the same time, there is a need to explain that these are complex, complicated bureaucratic processes and that our country has to fulfill specific criteria, rules, and so on, and this does not happen often. Being given EU candidate status was a really big step forward, but it was more of a recognition of the heroic resilience of Ukraine and its people than anything else. Then again, if the government does not keep up this kind of pressure on the EU and NATO, there will never be any meaningful progress. While this may create unrealistic expectations, there is no alternative.

STANDARD: What is the EU’s role in helping to solve this dilemma?

Dubovyk: Thankfully, EU leaders are very actively working with Ukraine. Ursula von der Leyen has proven to be a formidable leader. She is someone who lets Ukraine know exactly what needs to be done, and it shows. Concerning NATO, I think what will happen is not that Ukraine will receive full membership anytime soon but something that comes very close to it. We are already cooperating with NATO on an unprecedented scale, and the cooperation is so deep that, in reality, it just needs to be formalized.

STANDARD: While the focus is very much on Ukraine and Russia, there have been considerable knock-on effects throughout the Black Sea region since the war started, perhaps most notably in Georgia. The Georgian government has been remarkably hesitant to condemn the invasion and maintains cordial relations with Moscow, going as far as restoring direct flights to and from Moscow. Why?

Dubovyk: I think Georgia understands that Russia may be weak but it is still very dangerous and can destabilize the country. It feels like the Georgian government does not want to poke the bear, even if it is wounded. While the bear may be exhausted and bleeding, it is very much still alive. You must not forget hundreds of thousands of Russians have gone to Georgia since the start of the invasion, and it may be safe to assume there are professional provocateurs among them who are specialized in destabilizing other countries. So the reaction of the Georgian government may be more about self-preservation than anything else.

STANDARD: Is the imprisonment of former Georgian president Michail Saakashvili, whose lawyers claim he is being poisoned and tortured like Russian dissident Alexei Navalny is in Russia, just another manifestation of this mindset?

Dubovyk: I am not going to judge Saakashvili’s case on the merits of the charges against him, but it sure looks politicized. It indeed appears that someone is trying to get revenge on him because of what he did as Georgia’s president. Many people in Georgia still believe that the country was moving forward when he was in office and that there was no development, no progress since he left. Then again, why he went back in the first place is a bit of a mystery to me. It was clear he would face charges, just like Navalny did. Perhaps he counted on popular opinion being on his side, but he clearly misread the situation. It looks like he is in grave danger of dying in prison now. I am afraid if he does, that may add to the problems of the current Georgian government, but I do not see it leading to any civil strife or even revolution. (Klaus Stimeder, 5 July 2023).

(This post is republished from DerStandard.)