Zelensky’s Peace Summit – Experts Respond
Featuring Volodymyr Dubovyk, Visiting Scholar at the Fletcher Russia and Eurasia Program
Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky hosted a Peace Summit in Bürgenstock, Switzerland, on June 15-16, 2024. The Summit was attended by representatives of 92 countries and eight international organizations, and its result was a Joint Communiqué on a Peace Framework, signed by 84 participating states and six organizations. While the Summit intentionally excluded Russian representatives—and while important participants such as China declined to attend—it represents an important step in future negotiations and support for Ukraine’s long-term goals. Below, three HURI experts weigh in on the impact of the Summit, its weaknesses, and the role of Putin’s so-called peace proposal released on June 14.
Putin’s vision of “peace” a reminder of why war is raging
On 16 June 2024 in Switzerland, about 90 countries and international organizations signed on to the Ukraine-initiated peace summit communiqué, setting the stage for future international efforts to end Russia’s ongoing aggression against Ukraine. Moscow’s violation of international norms has been so deep and profound, that the summit organizers did not invite Russia to attend this session in order to first reaffirm the principles on which future talks would be based.
The communiqué referenced a number of important issues, including nuclear safety, food security, full exchange of prisoners, and repatriation of Ukrainian civilians. But the core of the document focused on the principles enshrined in the UN Charter. Specifically, the communiqué reaffirmed the signatories’ “commitment to the principles of sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of all states, including Ukraine, within their internationally recognized borders.” It also asserted that these principles “will serve as a basis in achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine.”
Was the summit an unmitigated success? It is difficult to make this claim. The number of attendees could have been higher and the presence of certain countries, including the PRC and India, could have given it additional heft. But was the summit a failure? Not at all. All the settled continents were represented and the fact that attendance was Europe-heavy should be hardly surprising considering where the war is taking place. Other commentary contributors have delved more deeply into these aspects, so I will focus on several related developments.
The peace summit clearly garnered Moscow’s attention, as evidenced by Russian ruler Vladimir Putin’s speech on the eve of the peace conference. The bulk of this speech was devoted to the so-called “special military operation,” a euphemism for Russia’s ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine. Given its timing, Putin had an opportunity for a mini charm offensive to further complicate Ukraine’s efforts. But Putin could not help himself and instead launched into ahistorical and discredited theses about supposed Western betrayals and complicity in Ukraine’s 2013-2014 Revolution of Dignity, which Putin disingenuously describes as a “coup.”
In the middle of this stream of unconsciousness, Putin laid out his terms for BEGINNING peace talks with Ukraine. These “simple conditions” included the complete withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from Ukraine’s Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhya oblasts, which Kyiv would have to recognize as Russian along with occupied Crimea. Moscow would expect Kyiv to renounce plans to secure its future through NATO membership. Putin’s vision for Ukraine’s end state at the conclusion of this de facto capitulation would also entail neutrality, demilitarization, and “denazification.” Putin also insisted that “the rights, freedoms, and interests of Russian-speaking citizens must be fully ensured,” a nod to what was his nominal pretext for war.
These terms go a long way in explaining why the war is still raging and why Kyiv is reluctant to even engage with Moscow. They also underscore that Moscow’s overarching objective for this war remains the same – Ukraine’s subjugation. But Putin’s terms would also amount to a clear rejection of the UN-centered international system. To accept these terms would be tantamount to becoming complicit in bringing about this dangerous and highly consequential inflection point.
Eugene M. Fishel, Ph.D., Distinguished Fellow, Center for Security Policy Studies, Schar School of Policy and Government, George Mason University
Ukraine’s peace plan needs support from the Global South
On 15-16 June 2024, more than 100 countries and organizations gathered at a resort near Lucerne in Switzerland for a major conference initiated by Ukraine. This Global Peace Summit was dedicated to setting out a path toward peace in Ukraine, where for more than two years Russia has been waging a full-scale military aggression aimed at destroying Ukrainian statehood and nationhood. The gathering underscored that peace remains elusive. Overall, the peace summit confirmed that the world remains divided, with most western states but only some in the Global South backing Ukraine’s objective to end the war on terms that restore its territorial integrity and hold the aggressor accountable. The summit also confirmed that Ukraine and Russia remain irreconcilably far apart in their vision of an acceptable end to the war.
Ukraine’s objective was to secure maximum global participation and backing of President Zelensky’s 10-point peace plan he first outlined in late 2022. From the start, the peace conference was focused on the three points seen as least contentious, and thus most likely to secure wide backing: addressing nuclear security, food security, the release of prisoners of war and the return of Ukrainian children abducted by Russia. But despite such concessions and pre-summit state visits by Zelensky to several states in the Global South, such as Singapore, the Philippines, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, some key non-western states either did not participate in the event or participated but did not sign the final communiqué. China’s absence was predictable, and Russia was not invited by design, but several states that attended didn’t sign the final communiqué (these include India, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Thailand, Indonesia and the UAE, among others). Absence of Russia (and presence of Israel) were used as reasons to abstain from signing by some of the attending states, such as India, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa.
The argument that “all parties to the conflict” need to be in agreement for peace to take hold is reasonable in the abstract, but when applied to Russia’s war against Ukraine, this argument shows a lack of acknowledgement that in this particular conflict, one side is seeing destruction and subjugation of the other side, so a “compromise” under such conditions is either wishful thinking or tacit endorsement of Russia’s goal to subjugate and occupy Ukraine. Much work remains to be done by Ukrainian diplomats and supporters of Ukraine globally to undo the myth of Russia as an anti-imperial and anti-colonial power that remains strong in much of the Global South.
Putin’s own non-starter “peace proposal” on the eve of the summit served as another reminder that Ukraine and Russia remain irreconcilably apart in their objectives – with Ukraine determined to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity and Russia seeking to deny Ukraine both. Putin’s demand that in order for negotiations to even start, Ukraine must withdraw from much of the territory in the south that it has liberated from the Russian occupation earlier, hand over additional territories in the south and the east that Russia never managed to occupy, and forego NATO membership is a setup for capitulation, not peace. Agreeing to these terms would not only condemn more Ukrainians to the brutalization of the Russia occupation but would also give Russia a foothold on the right bank of the Dnipro River to facilitate further territorial push at any time. Ukraine wants a second peace summit to take place this year, but for any peace summit to result in a just peace, the aggressor needs to be made to see that they cannot achieve their maximalist goals. Military support for Ukraine’s defense, closing loopholes in the sanctions regime against Russia, and working with the Global South to break existing stereotypes about Russia’s war are necessary to advance this goal.
Oxana Shevel, Associate Professor, Political Science and Director of International Relations program, International Relations
Outcomes on the battlefield will determine the direction of peace accords
The recent peace summit in Bürgenstock, Switzerland has captured attention of those closely observing the dynamics in Russia’s war on Ukraine. It was a notable event, which was attended by numerous political leaders and enjoyed close media monitoring.
Ukraine has invested a lot of energy, time and diplomatic resource into this summit. Clearly, this was a priority for Kyiv, certainly a significant event for president Volodymyr Zelensky’s team. The amount of work put into this summit has led to some perhaps unrealistic, heightened expectations in Ukraine. Ukrainians clearly are, by now, exhausted by the long and unwavering massive assault by Russia. This has contributed to people naturally longing for peace, and, thus, hoping for some sort of breakthrough in Switzerland. In real life, though, just like the chronologically preceding Ukraine reconstruction conference in Berlin, this has not been a seminal event that would be in position to dramatically alter the pace of war and Ukraine’s eventual fate.
The peace summit has been a demonstration of a wide support across the world for Ukraine as a victim of unyielding Russian aggression. Ukraine’s position was reaffirmed in the summit’s final document. If that was an objective for the Ukrainian government, then it was achieved. But it wasn’t a step towards the cessation of hostilities. And it wasn’t meant to be, with the clearest sign being that Russia was excluded from taking part. This was not peace negotiations. The only way to set the frame for the war’s endgame without Russia’s participation would be to ensure Russia’s definite defeat. This was why Kyiv was adamant for Russia not to be there—still hoping for its defeat. Short of such a defeat, there is hardly a path to peace without Russia being a part of the process.
Several countries that were absent in Bürgenstock, or those who were represented but did not sign the final document, seem to lean toward the idea that there must be participation by Russia for the peace process to take root. They also tend to exhibit more so-called “neutrality” regarding the war in general, for a number of reasons. Some just value their relationship with Russia, or China, or both, too much to side with Ukraine and the West. Others have ambitions vis-à-vis what they see as a Western-dominated world, so they choose not to solidarize with the West-supported position, hiding behind rhetoric about fairness and neutrality. These outliers are not in a position to dramatically affect the pace of war, but considering that Kyiv saw the summit, among other things, as an attempt to ensure more support in the so-called “Global South,” such an outcome was a bit of a setback for Ukraine.
Russia, in the meantime, projects confidence about ultimately prevailing in its war with Ukraine. This confidence is based on their own belief that the victory will eventually be on their side. Just like Ukraine, they understand that ultimately, the outcome of the war and the shape of peace will depend on the outcome of the fighting on the battlefield. Thus, the only way forward that may assure a fair peace is to continue to support Ukraine so that Kyiv can have successes on the battleground, and, thus, a stronger negotiating position for that time when real peace talks may start.
Volodymyr Dubovyk, Associate Professor, Odesa I. Mechnikov University.
(This post is republished from Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute (HURI).)