Implications of the Russian Elections
By CEPA, featuring Irina Borogan, Ivan Fomin, Pavel Luzin, Andrei Soldatov, and Sam Greene (Luzin is a visiting scholar at Fletcher Russia and Eurasia Program.)
Sam Greene
Good morning in the US. Good afternoon to those joining us on this side of the Atlantic where I’m joining you from the UK. Welcome to Center for European Policy Analysis and a discussion on the upcoming Russian elections. I’ll put those in scare quotes for reasons I’m sure we’ll get into. Very grateful for all of your time at what I know is a busy moment for everybody. Also very grateful to have three of my excellent CEPA colleagues on the call with us today. We’re joined also from here in the UK by Andrei Soldatov, Senior Non-resident Fellow at CEPA. You will all have read all of his books together with that with Irina Borogan, I’m certainly including The New Nobility, The Red Web, The Compatriots, and more. Also joining us from Europe, from Prague, specifically, is Dr. Ivan Fomin, political scientist at Charles University there in the Czech Republic and a specialist in our Russian elite politics and ideology and as well as public opinion. And joining us from Boston, from his perch at Tufts University and other Senior Non-resident Fellow with us at CEPA is Dr. Pavel Luzin who specializes in Russia’s political economy, security sector, and the military. What will happen at the end of these elections is probably not news. I don’t think that I’m giving away any secrets by saying that. We will have voting beginning tomorrow running through Sunday, we expect results to be announced somewhere on Monday, the 18th of March, and we expect those results to fairly well match up against the targets that the presidential administration in Russia has announced. So something in the range of about 80% vote for Putin against about 70% turnout, whether or not we decided to believe those numbers is something we can get into. We’re also expecting the opposition to try to make at least something of a show of force in at least one of two ways. Both showing up on at noon, local time on the 17th of of March, the final day of voting to, in an informal protest as well as voting for anybody other than Putin in order to do a some damage to Putin’s numbers. Both of these, not coincidentally, are ideas that had been promoted by Alexey Navalny before he was murdered on the 16th of February in prison. We’ll get into all of this, get into anything else that you are interested in. I’ll invite everybody to post questions to the chat or simply raise your hand, on mute yourself, turn on your camera, and join in in the conversation. This is an on the record conversation. So please do feel free to use anything that you hear from me and my colleagues. Although probably not from each other. We will have a recording of this distributed more or less immediately after the call and we’ll produce a transcript that will be available to you later. If you’d like to get in touch with any of the team to go into more depth on any of this, we will be happy to help you. And we’ll talk about that a little bit at the end of the call. So just to get us started, go around the table. Basic question, what are we what are we tracking? We’re not so much interested probably in the result, although you might tell me that that you are, right. What will you be looking for on election day? What are the key variables? And Ivan, I think I’ll start with you.
Ivan Fomin
Thanks. Probably the first thing that I will look at on the Election Day is if there will be any effect from this non against Putin action that was supported by Alexey Navalny and his allies. We’ve seen some surprises in this, similar suprises in the recent. Recently, in Russia, when for example, nobody expected the large over turnout, for example, or what was going to be that big of a turnout for Alexey Navalny’s funeral, or there’s going to be a huge mobilization around these anti war candidates Nadezhdin. So I think we can expect something unexpected, something unusual, and it’s a new strategy for the Russian opposition. So it’s an interesting thing to think to track. Another thing that we wish to take into account here that even though the results that will be declared on the election night, won’t be that surprising and informative. But afterwards, we can download the more detailed data for each individual politician and from this it is usually possible to get a better picture in terms of what is the actual number of votes casted for Putin, minus the ballots stuffed. So there will be some information that can be extracted from the voting results here. Another probably interesting figure will be the amount of votes casted for Davankov. The less awful candidate of them all, even though, I can’t say he is an anti-war one, but he is not that bad. So that is another thing will probably be checking.
Sam Greene
Okay. Lots to pick up on there. And I’m certain we will as the conversation moves forward, but I’ll pass the baton to Pavel next, what are you looking at?
Pavel Luzin
So on the elections date, or maybe days after the elections, it will be interesting to look at the results of voting in the military bases of Russia. And I’m sure that this data will be available, but the data from the voting points on the occupied territories where the Russian military, they vote. Because I remember July 2020, the voting for constitutional amendments in Russia. And I remember that some huge military bases, like Strategic Rocket divisions, like the main base of the Northern Fleet, in Severomorsk, they voted against them and as a percentage wasn’t too high. I mean, against, it was at about 50%, sometimes 51% against But the problem was that this morning was very unusual for the Russian Armed Forces. So I’m curious whether or not the Russian army will vote against Putin today. I am not expecting you know, some sensations here. But nevertheless, it will be interesting to search for some signs of disagreements.
Sam Greene
Okay. I may come back and ask you to expand on that a little bit in a moment but I’ll pivot first to to Andrei, what will you be looking for this weekend?
Andrei Soldatov
Thank you, Sam. And first of all, it’s really great to see so many familiar names. If not faces. Well, what we’ve seen recently is an increasing activity of Russian intelligence and security services, which are extremely aggressive. In four weeks, we got three operations: against Navalny, against his top lieutenant in Vilnius, against Russian defector in Spain. And, well, of course, we understand that this increase in activities is caused by two main reasons. One is that the Russian intelligence agencies found a way how to regroup by the end of last year. And this is a direct result of his newfound sense of purpose, and confidence, and capabilities, they discovered throughout 2023. But of course it also reflects the Kremlin’s paranoid about the upcoming election. And, again, I just wanted to stress that for many people, and the Russian intelligence and security services, this is a moment of a crisis and potentially is a very dangerous moment, because they believe in historical parallels. And for them, they constantly refer to the experience of the Russian Revolution 1917, when the war and political crisis led to a revolution and destruction of the Russian Empire. Now we see the war, they see the election, which is by the fault of them, is a potential political crisis. And for them, it’s a direct example that, look, we need to be extremely careful, we need to be proactive. And because it is a political stability which is at stakes, everything is justifiable, including the killing of political opponents, attacks abroad, and all of that. My biggest problem, and my biggest concern is that because of the elections, we get, we can, and we already see a new level of repression against the country and outside. And the problem is that these level of activities, might stay this way after the election, because it’s usually what happens. They use the Russian agencies, they use the election as an excuse, and then they just make this methods and activities as part of the playbook. And my biggest concern, they’re going to be using this for months and months to come.
Sam Greene
Thanks for that. You mentioned sort of what you said, months and months to come. Right. And I think that pivots very nicely to, to the next question: if the elections themselves aren’t all that surprising, doesn’t mean that they’re not consequential. What do we expect to happen after the elections? What do we expect from Putin’s next, his fifth term, term in office? Ivan?
Ivan Fomin
Yeah, I believe one thing we can look at here is Putin made this promise during his recent speech, for the presidential assembly. He said about some emergence or necessity for a new elite to emerge from those people who it evolved into more. And it is interesting to see whether it was just some promise that Putin wanted to make for, to get some extra points, or there’s going to be some actual attempts to actually bring this, these shifts really to life. If there will be some actual shifts it is an interesting thing to see what will happen to the old elite it’s going to be some attempt to replace the old elite with a new one. Even though I personally don’t think that it is very likely that some big shifts, some big changes, in the elite are likely but maybe we’ll see some interesting elements on that. Another interesting thing is what unpopular decisions we will see after the election because I believe we should expect some decisions for now helped. Manturnov said that some Russian trade before the election that we will see brought to life after the election, like for example, the increase of the income tax or some other attempts to extract more, more money from the population. And finally, one more thing that is not about the Kremlin, but about about Russian politics in general is what will be the new way the Russian opposition or Russian dissidents in exile, how they will reinvent themselves after the death of Alexey Navalny. Because for now, everybody is focused on election but after the election, I think it’s gonna be a moment to reflect on what to do next and how these strategies of the opposition has to change to adapt to the death of Navalny. So, yeah, these are probably the things I will focus on after the election.
Sam Greene
Thank you for that, again, lots to pick up there both in terms of as you ended with the opposition. But as I sort of hand the baton back to Pavel and please do tell us what you’re thinking generally, in terms of both the near term, but the next six years. I do wonder also what you make of this idea that Ivan mentioned, and that Putin floated in his address to the Federal Assembly, about you know, empowering the elite or a new elite emerging from the special military operation.
Pavel Luzin
Towards the new elite, the elite which should come from veteran community or something like that, I presume there is mostly an imitation or imitative rhetoric. Because the most of veterans, they are not ready to be in it at all, because of their educational level, because lack of experience, and so on, and so on, so on. But Putin’s speech was a promise to those representatives of bottom level elite, especially in Russian regions, who went to the battlefield, because in 2022 2023, we saw such examples. When some members of local Parliament’s some local entrepreneurs, politicians and so on, they moved to Donbass, or Kherson, to Zaporizhzhia as soldiers, or as volunteers with some aid or some technical assistance to the Russian military. And currently, they came back, and they pretend to improve their positions within the Russian bureaucracy and within the Russian political establishment. And, of course, the amount of these people is not so huge, maybe hundreds of them, or thousands of them. But Putin promised them improvements. And, of course, we shouldn’t overestimate the military experience of these volunteers, because their participation in the war was also imitate, because we definitely know that these people paid big money to the Russian commanders. And they spent a short period of time in the formerly battle zone, but they never participated, you know, in daily combat activity in the frontline. They spent their several weeks or a couple of months on the occupied territories of Ukraine far from the frontline, far from the frontline, as they did something, and they came back and represent themselves as heroes of the war and so and so on. So Putin imitates, he imitates the renewal of elites, the bottom level representatives of Russian political establishment, imitates their participation in the war, and so and so on. It’s a great bargaining. It is a great bargaining because, nevertheless, there is an objective fact. The current Russian leaders, they’re old enough and they are going to transfer their power in the coming years to their kids or to their grandsons, granddaughters, and so on. Look at partnership look at Kirienko, look at even Putin personally, look at other people, look at Governor’s kids. So I do not expect too big reshuffles or changes, but some changes are inevitable. There will be some changes in the Russian government. There will be changes, or should be changes, next year in the Russian Central Bank. Because Elvira Nabiullina should be retired, according to the Russian laws apparently. Even toward Valery Gerasimov, the head of the Russian General Staff. He is 68 years old, he exceeded the level, the age limit on the military service, because he should be retired at 65. Currently, he is still in charge. And probably he is mobilized. I don’t know. But the problem is that the Russian leadership must change some people. On some key positions.
Sam Greene
Okay, so lots again to look forward to there. Andre, what will you be expecting from the next year to six?
Andrei Soldatov
I think that what is inevitable is that the Russian military will get more prominent in Russian politics and every war in Russia. And it doesn’t matter how disastrous it was, nevertheless produced very popular generals who played a really significant part of Russian politics. So Yeltsin had his score and levity of battle. And that then Yeltsin had of course, a bunch of generals, who became prominent because of the First Chechen War the Second Chechen War. Now we have Surovikin and some others. And I think this is something Putin needs to find a way how to deal with. He needs to either to co-op some of them and make them more prominent, or he need to find a way how to keep them under complete control. His way to do that last year was precaution, this option is not there anymore. So he needs to find and to come up with some new solutions to that. The interesting thing is that the Russian security services are getting more and more Stalinist like in their methods and I think the most recent case, an attack on the zeal of and his friends, is a great proof that they are getting more and more methods out of Stalin’s playbook in terms of creating an imaginary nonexistent organization to then accused their members of crimes against the state, like high of treason and all of that. So how this would play out is increasing activity of the Russian security services against elites and the growing presence and influence of the Russian military industrial complex and the military. In general, that will be the most interesting process and for for all of us to watch. And all do we have any good news here? I don’t think so. I think what we also need to understand that it’s, again, it’s all about these history lessons. And as far as I get it from, from people I speak with, they believe they are now in 1942. So they already scored some successes, they are ready to big losses on the battlefield because of the 1942, variables of 1943. So this kind of logic is still there. Well, to be honest, the only surprise I might expect is if the Kremlin would force the military to go on a really huge offensive because that would be extremely costly. But otherwise, yeah, just the same stuff.
Sam Greene
Um, so looking around the room, we’ve got lots of people with a lot of really great knowledge on this on this beat. So I will invite people to ask questions. We’ve got one that’s come in from Marco. With the lines now drawn, why is it so important for Putin to maintain his sham democracy? Do Russians believe these are free and fair elections. Ivan, I might kick that to you.
Ivan Fomin
Yeah, I think for Putin, it is important, because he believes that it’s important to maintain this image. I think what we should take into account here is that, even though Putin is often associated with this desire for a multipolar world, his own understanding of how the world works, its better the assumption is the world’s very much unipolar. And I think for Putin personally it does matter that he is recognized. And so this is one of the reasons I believe he does consider this necessary to maintain these elections, just as a facade at least. And in terms of what Russia’s thing is, if we take a look at the polls, there are tens of millions of people who don’t think that the elections in Russia are are free and fair. But the question is that what is their strategy in this situation? Will be they will they be just, will they stay at home if they dont belive in the elections? Will they choose to vote for anyone except for Putin? Or will they just do something else, go protest? What we see now is that, with this immense pressure, put immense repressions against dissidents. People still opt to use this piano to express their sentiment, their opinion. Even though they don’t assume, its doesnt mean that they have to believe the elections are free and fair.
Sam Greene
Okay, we’ve got another question. Do we expect the blocking of YouTube during or after the elections and further repressions against Russian language media? Andrei, I might push that in your direction.
Andrei Soldatov
No, no, no, no, no, look, I give up making these kinds of predictions since 2020, as I famously promised to that Facebook going to be blocked by the end of 2022, excuse me, YouTube being blocked by by the end of 2022. So no, no, no, no, no predictions here. As far as I see, the Russian government still struggling with the substitute for Youtube. And as far as I understand, the idea was that they need to get something out which actually works. And only after that they might go after YouTube. And we all say that YouTube is not really a good option and some other ideas are also not very good. But the problem is that it’s a political decision, and it might be prompted by some emotions. So no, no predictions here.
Sam Greene
Right. But I think it is, it’s useful to have in mind sort of the calculations, right, that they may be considering. So Thanks for for outlining, that. Pavel, I might ask you to address Mike Eccles question on mobilization and will there be another round of mobilization after the election? Will the ongoing alternative efforts of recruitment ie high wages, pardons, death benefits for widows, suffice to maintain the troop levels that that Putin needs in the face of what remains a highly costly war in terms of casualties?
Pavel Luzin
So thanks for the question. In 2023, was so the alternative way of recruiting. More than 100,000 prisoners have been recruited in the Armed Forces. Additionally too, 50 or 60,000 prisoners, which had been recruited to Wagner Group previously in fall 2022. So more than 100,000 prisoners, Some, so-called volunteers, some contracted soldiers, new contracted soldiers who wanted, who was going to, to make money in the war, but currently there are two big problems. The first problem is that the number of prisoners is not endless. And you cannot send all the prisoners to the war because 1000s of them, 10,000s of them are needed for manufacturing within the prison system of Russia, because the prison system of Russia, it works like an economic actor. And also probably heard that some Russian factories, including the arms factories, they also needed prisoners for some bottom level jobs. Also, prisoners are needed to the Russian railways for construction of bipolar mods, bipolar more railway or the Russian Far East. So, the number of prisoners is limited. Secondly, the number of those who is still going to the war for making money is decreasing, fastly decreasing. And this process even recognized by the pro-government or Russian experts, for instance, Ruslan Pukhov, in his recent paper in the Russian Global Affairs journal, he’s said about this problem, and he said that the amount of volunteers is really limited, currently it is declining. And that means that in 2024, the Kremlin will need to decide if the level of losses will remain high, as it is today as it was during the last several months. So, if the level of losses will remain high, so the Kremlin will need to find more soldiers. And there are two options. Yes, you may conduct the second wave of mobilization, mobilization by force, yeah, by coercion. But also, we always forget about draft soldiers, 200,000 of them, and according to the Russian laws, they may be sent to the war, just after four months of service, just four months of servers and conscripted soldiers, draft soldiers may dissent to the war, and the only reason why the drafted soldiers are not on the war officially. It’s just political will of the Kremlin. There are not any other limits for this. And because the occupied territories of Ukraine have been included into the South Military District since March the First, 2024. That means the leadership of the South military district can easily relocate drafted soldiers from one region to another. From Volgograd region to Zaporizhzhia and back. So, the conscript, conscripted soldiers are the elephant in the room. It’s a big amount of soldiers and maybe the Kremlin will decide not to mobilize more people, more civilians, because the Kremlin still has this, drafted soldiers.
Sam Greene
Understood. Thank you. I know Andrei that you have to run in a moment. So I want to give you the chance to to address two questions. Joanna asked about whether we should see the attacks that you mentioned on Navalny and Volkov as related to the elections and whether we should, and derivative universe question on whether we should expect a crash on anybody who does try to protest this weekend?
Andrei Soldatov
Ah, yes, thank you. Yes, I think these attacks are directly linked to the elections. And this is a way how the response system actually works, that the security services they need to respond tothe challenge of that action by removing any element, of possible descent, unrest, or whatever, which might cause a big political crisis, and because they have a sense of fragility of the state, which might, which actually, anything might cause a new, bloody revolution. That’s why all of a sudden you get your wildest ideas being signed up by your superiors threat, so they, they gotta go. And that’s why I think these operations were conducted in such a short order, because now they have the election, and it’s a great justification regarding what might happen to people who actually would try to follow Navalny’s advice. Yes, unfortunately, I think it’s very likely, because now the Russian State has this great tool at its disposal, which I mean, face recognition system are anthropologists technologies introduced in big cities, which help them and let them to identify people afterwards. They have been using this method extensively, first, against those who didn’t comply with COVID regulations. So the uses of the same system, very effectively against protesters against the war in 2022. Now we see the same system applied against people who went to the funeral, or to the cemetery of Navalny so yes, I think it’s very possible.
Sam Greene
Okay. Ivan, I’m going to ask you if I might to address, Mark Trevelyan’s question, picking up on what you mentioned, about how the dissidents in exile may reinvent themselves and re strategize after the elections and after obviously, the death of Alexey Navalny. What are the strategies that are available to them?
Ivan Fomin
Yeah, I think one thing we can start with is just to try to analyze what roles of Navalny, what what did the Russian opposition lose with Navalny’s death. So obviously, with Navalny’s death, what the opposition has lost is this informal but more or less recognized leader of at least the anti-war and the liberal part of the Russian opposition, or at least the most reputable figure among opposition leaders here. But at the same time, he was also an important symbolic figure. And I think that after he was in prison, he became even more relevant to do it, with respect. And in this capacity, even after his death, Navalny is still relevant and he still can be this important consolidating figure for the opposition. Maybe an even stronger figure in this respect because for many people, he became a martyr. And he, even for those people who saw him as a more controversial figure, after his death he’s definitely maybe a more, a much more acceptable embolic figure around which the opposition can be organized and consolidated. Another thing is what the opposition can do with their show lack of the figure that can be presented. In fact, I think that Yulia Navalnaya is probably the strongest, the strongest figure, or for now, here. I think that because she has some some popular, she has had some popularity from her husband. And we see some important symbol gestures from the US, from the EU countries, to interact with her as a this voice of anti-war Russians. And I think it is important and I hope that we’ll see more, more of that, in this aspect. If we take a look at what’s happening in Russia, I believe that it is important test for the Russian opposition and for the Russian dissidents who are in exile, to attempt to interact somehow, with the emergent leader, opinion leaders. For example, among the mobilized soldiers wives and mothers and so on. All kinds of dissident voices in Russia are important and they think it is important not for the Russian opposition not to be just isolated in their bubble in exile, just try to do as much as possible to maintain connections with people who are forced to in Russian.
Sam Greene
Thanks for that. We have a question from Marco. Has Putin been awaiting a potential Trump victory? In other words, I suppose I can re reinterpret the question is the election that really matters for Russia. The one that’s going to happen in the US in November? Who might want to venture a guess at this question pile?
Pavel Luzin
Yeah, definitely the Russian leadership, not only Putin personally but all his team, they are waiting for Trump. And says this intention to deal with Trump is mostly psychological, or emotional, then relational, because we all remember that Trump was this president who imposed sanctions on the Russian military industrial complex in 2017. And the sanctions were painful. It was the president who authorized the killing of the head of Islamic Revolution Guard Corps in Iran. It was a President who authorized elimination of several hundreds of the Wagner mercenaries in Syria and who authorized it, missile strikes against chemical facilities in Syria as well. So I don’t know why as the Kremlin believes that Trump would be better for the Kremlin then, the Biden administration, for example. But the Russian leadership is expecting for this, because the Russian leadership also understands very well that time works against the Kremlin. Because the Russian military power it is not exhausted, but it is in the process of exhausting not only manpower, but also storage of arms. The capacity of the Russian military industry is also limited, as the storage of components is limited, as the amount of industrial equipment is limited, and currently, there is a growing problems, there are growing problems with maintaining the machine tools purchased in previous decades, for example. So it’s a kind of emotional belief. Yes, Trump will change everything Trump will improve the Russian conditions. I presume the Kremlin is wrong. I presume that the American political establishment is consolidated enough in the process of deterring Russia. So.
Sam Greene
Okay let me, Pavel sticking with you come back to Henry Meyers question who asked a while ago you also the question about mobilisation after the election, right, but also the flip side of that, right. So is it possible that the Kremlin might pivot to seeking a diplomatic or a negotiated end to the end to the fighting, if not an end of the war? Right? You outlined all of the reasons, all of the challenges that the Kremlin is facing and the Russian military you’re facing, and you talked about all of the various costly and imperfect options for putting more men on the front line. You didn’t mention the option of not putting more men on the front line and deciding it’s time to stop fighting. Is there any prospect of the Kremlin coming to that one?
Pavel Luzin
Yes, if you remember, I mentioned that if the current level of losses will remain so the Kremlin will need some painful solutions. But the Kremlin is going to decrease the number of forces. The Kremlin is going to get a break in the war, not the end of the war, but the break. And during February this year, Putin personally said three times about the negotiations with the West. And he is trying to trade the strategic stability negotiations to trade on some negotiations towards Ukraine. Because the official Kremlin’s position is that we cannot divide these negotiations, we should combine them, if we if Americans are going to discuss nuclear arms, military space activities, and so on. So let’s also discuss, let’s also discuss Ukraine. And also many procurement experts and journalists, they are promoting so called Korean scenario for this war. I mentioned today an example have, also couple of days ago, Alexei Venediktov the former editor in chief of the Echo Moscow Radio Station, she came to Moldova. And she was also promoting the Korean scenario. And look at some of your colleagues in European media. They are promoting Korean scenario as well, because it is not the solution. But it is a measure for decreasing intensity of the war. And Russia needs a break, because even now, even if Russia is preparing for escalation in the Baltic region, for example, Russia does not have enough troops, because all the Russian combat capable troops are in Ukraine. So Russia needs to withdraw some troops from Ukraine to send them for instance, to Suwałki Gap or to Lithuania, to Estonia, or to Finland. And that is a trick. He, of course, Russia is wanting to have negotiations this year, or maybe at the beginning of 2025. But it doesn’t mean that Russia is going to end the war.
Sam Greene
Yeah, it’s something we’ve, talked about and written about it, I would commend to everybody, our paper, which Pavel contributed to as well on on a strategy of containment, which which looks at some of these eventualities. Ivan though, I might push you on the domestic politics angle of of this, right. You know, I think most, certainly my analysis, of Putin’s appeal, right, is that this is for Russia, you know, an existential war, which essentially lasts forever, right? Because it’s not just a war of Ukrainian territory, it’s a war for Russia’s survival against the West that will never allow Russia to exist, and to be strong, and prosperous. If Pavel is right, and that they might, in the foreseeable future, pivot to a reduction in tensions in order to give themselves some some breathing space how difficult do you think it will be for the Kremlin to manage that narrative, domestically, ideologically and politically?
Ivan Fomin
I think it’s completely manageable. I think that Putin’s control of media is so strong that he can basically sell any narrative he wants. And even if people don’t agree, there are plenty of riot police in Russia who can take care of that. So I don’t think it is going to be an issue for Putin. I think it’s the demand for peace is Russia is huge. And basically, Putin often says that it’s an attempt One narrative about the eternal war with the West. Well in that narrative that Putin doesnt actually start of the war, but he tries to end it, because I think Putin is very much aware that the demand for the escalation, for the end of the war is huge in Russian society. We can discuss what are the acceptable conditions because the situation in the Russian society is very complex in this respect, different opinions, but overall sentiment is the majority of people want the war to end. So I think it won’t be a problem for Putin to sell any end of the war. Even if there are going to be some territorial concessions, though I think Putin will not do that. But it’s not impossible to imagine it from the point of view of the Russian public opinion. There is even room for that.
Sam Greene
Okay. Do we have any further questions I can always keep talking to my colleagues for hours and hours. But I know that you have limited time and my colleagues may have limited time and limited patience for me. We all have work to do. If there are no further questions, I will hand over to my colleague Sarah Krajewski for a little bit of housekeeping. And take it from there.
Sarah Krajewski
Thank you so much, Sam. And thank you Pavel, Ivan, and Andrei for everything that they’ve provided today. Thanks, everyone for joining and especially to those of you who navigated the exciting daylight savings, non-daylight savings time zone Jenga that we like to play in these fun few weeks in March. I will send out the recording of this later today. And the transcript will be available on the CEPA website on Friday morning. If you have any further questions about anything mentioned today or would like to follow up or just for further requests, please email press@cepa.org and I will do my best to get back to you as fast as I can. And visit cepa.org for further coverage as we gear up to the election. Yeah, thank you.
(This post is republished from CEPA.)