Putin deals a weak hand in Wagner revolt
For a regime dependent on Russian President Vladimir Putin’s “tough guy” persona and the threat of violence, the events over the weekend — which saw only the rebels deploy violence and saw Putin portrayed as a second-tier player — create long-term political problems.
By Chris Miller, Associate Professor of International History at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
Russian mercenary chief Yevgeny Prigozhin’s putsch appears to have sputtered out after he announced a deal on Sunday with the Kremlin whereby his forces will be integrated into the Russian military. Prigozhin will reportedly depart for Belarus. President Vladimir Putin of Russia has avoided a march on Moscow, but he has been seriously weakened by both the coup attempt and his irresolute response to it.
After seizing control of the southern Russian city of Rostov-on-Don, Prigozhin said he was ready to march to Moscow. Though most military commanders — including some who had previously been friendly with Wagner mercenaries — called on Prigozhin to stand down, he held calm negotiations Saturday morning with the head of Russia’s Southern Military District. The fact that a senior officer chatted with Prigozhin amid the mutiny rather than arresting him on the spot is evidence that Prigozhin’s coup attempt was somewhat popular in the military.
Putin’s inability or unwillingness to arrest Prigozhin is also a sign that Putin’s hold over Russia’s security services is weakening. The Kremlin clearly took seriously Prigozhin’s march on Moscow, setting up roadblocks along the relevant highways and mobilizing forces to resist it. Moreover, Prigozhin’s forces shot down a handful of Russian aircraft and helicopters during the fighting. In other words, this was a real coup attempt, not a show.
Throughout the revolt, Russian elites were confused and divided about the meaning of the mutiny. Leading Russian news outlets reported matter-of-factly about the events, suggesting that they had not received strong guidance from the Kremlin. The deal between the Kremlin and Prigozhin appears to have been announced first by Belarus, which reportedly brokered the deal, then by Prigozhin, before finally being confirmed by the Kremlin — hardly a suave PR strategy.
Indeed, the fact that the Kremlin resorted to foreign mediation implies weakness, especially given Putin’s focus on defending Russian sovereignty. The Belarusian government’s statement: “The President of Belarus informed the President of Russia in detail about the results of negotiations with the leadership of PMC Wagner. The President of Russia supported and thanked the Belarusian colleague for the work done.” This does not leave Putin sounding like a resolute commander-in-chief.
What does this mean for Russian politics in the coming months? Russian media headlines are describing the deal as “de-escalation.” Yet the fact that the mutiny was “de-escalated” rather than crushed suggests that the political aftershocks from the crisis may ricochet around Russian politics in unpredictable ways.
Indeed, it is hard to see Putin as the winner, though he has held onto power for now. Just consider the implications of the past few days. First, Putin’s forces proved unwilling or unable to stop a rebel group from seizing a major city. Second, his military was divided, some condemning Prigozhin, others taking a wait-and-see attitude. Third, Prigozhin will survive, at least for now, without any punishment. The criminal case against him has reportedly been dropped. The incentives this creates are highly destabilizing if future coup leaders think that failure brings not death or imprisonment but merely a comfortable retirement in Belarus.
In a rare moment of honesty, Putin’s press secretary, Dmitry Peskov, explained that Putin cut a deal with Prigozhin because “there was a higher goal — to avoid bloodshed, to avoid an internal confrontation.” Indeed, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that Russian elites were highly divided and that Putin was indecisive in this moment of crisis. For a regime dependent on Putin’s “tough guy” persona and the threat of violence, the events over the weekend — which saw only the rebels deploy violence and saw Putin portrayed as a second-tier player — create long-term political problems.
Ukrainian forces will be celebrating as their enemy is torn apart by internal divisions. Wagner’s rebellion may be resolved, but the political divisions and weakness it has exposed remain. The likelihood that Ukraine’s counteroffensive succeeds has surely increased markedly. And the likelihood that Putin is still in power in a year’s time is meaningfully lower. The curtain may have closed on this act — and even this is not yet certain — but more domestic political drama may follow.
(This post is republished from The Boston Globe.)